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Abstract 
While the work of Michel Foucault has not generally been thought to engage in questions of 
affect, I argue that his work entails a meaningful engagement with such questions but in a 
way that challenges how we tend to think about affect. Drawing from Foucault’s oeuvre, I 
enter a series of dialogues with thinkers of affect, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick, and Brian Massumi, in order to understand to what extent the turn to 
affect—especially for Sedgwick and Massumi—represents an attempt to work through a 
number of difficulties and tensions in Foucault’s thought and writing. I argue that Foucault is 
an insightful yet challenging interlocutor for affect theorists because of his understanding of 
the ethical dimensions of affect, and his historicization of separate modalities of relating to 
those areas of life and experience that belong to affect, emotion, and feeling. In this thesis, I 
aim to tease out that historicization in the form of two key historical modalities belonging to 
modern and ancient technologies of the self: the scientia affectus, which endeavours to 
decipher truth in emotion or affect, and the ars pathetica, which derives truth from feeling 
itself.   
Keywords 
Foucault, affect theory, genealogy, archaeology, ethics, philosophy of emotion, Sedgwick, 
Massumi. 
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Summary for Lay Audience 
For the past two centuries, the philosophy and science of emotion has been divided by two 
dominant approaches. The first approach argues that emotions are rooted in physiological 
responses and biological mechanisms of the body. This is the physicalist approach. The 
second attempts to show how emotions are involved in cognitive processes, as expressions of 
conscious or unconscious intentions, judgements, and evaluations. This is the cognitivist 
approach. Both approaches tend to imply separate assumptions about differences between 
individuals and cultures across time and geography. The first approach has often been 
committed to universalist theories of emotion, which argues that emotions are comprised by a 
handful of basic emotional registers or affects, such as sadness, joy, fear, or anger, believed to 
be essentially the same experiences across all human cultures throughout history. The second 
approach tends to entail a social constructionist view, which argues that both the experience 
and expression of emotion varies between cultures and through history. While there have 
been more recent efforts to synthesize these different approaches and sets of assumptions, I 
argue that there are indeed two ways of experiencing and relating to one’s emotions that have 
been predominant in the history of Western civilization. One, which I call the scientia 
affectus (or the science of affect/emotion), views emotions as substances or objects that can 
be known, measured, disciplined, and optimized. This generally includes all of the previously 
mentioned approaches (i.e., physicalist, universalist, cognitivist, and social constructionist 
approaches), and has represented the dominant way of thinking about emotion for the past 
two centuries. The second, which I call the ars pathetica (or the art of feeling), instead views 
emotions as practices that give truth, meaning, and style to one’s existence. This ars 
pathetica was dominant in the ancient cultures of Greece and Rome but today mostly exists 
as a memory. In this thesis I draw from the work of French philosopher Michel Foucault to 
show the ethical, political, and historical importance of these two ways of relating to feelings, 
and to try to understand the large mutation in Western civilization that has led to this 
transformation of an ars pathetica into a scientia affectus. 
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Introduction 
Michel Foucault is not generally thought of as a thinker of affect. For example, Nigel Thrift 
has commented on Foucault’s “seeming aversion to discussing affect explicitly” and his 
neglect of the “affective relays in the precognitive realm.”  Additionally, Foucault featured as 1
what Lauren Guilmette has called a “paranoid foil”  in Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s original 2
take-up of questions of affect,  in which Sedgwick cast Foucault as a thinker too immured in 3
the binary logic of subversion and hegemony to think what the editors of The Affect Theory 
Reader (2010) call the “in-betweenness” of affect  or, to use Sedgwick’s own phrase, the 4
“middle ranges of agency” that characterize queer subjectivity as well as the possibility of 
change and creativity.  Sedgwick and her partial critique of Foucault has come to represent 5
 Nigel Thrift, “Overcome by Space: Reworking Foucault,” in Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and 1
Geography, ed. Jeremy W. Crampton and Stuart Elden (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2007), 54.
 Lauren Guillmette, “In What We Tend to Feel Is Without History: Foucault, Affect, and the Ethics of 2
Curiosity,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 28.3 (2014), 285.
 For Sedgwick’s critique of Foucault and Foucaudian theorists (specifically D. A. Miller in The Novel and the 3
Police (1988) and Ann Cvetkovich in Mixed Feelings: Feminism, Mass Culture, and Victorian Sensationalism 
(1992)) see the “Introduction,” “Shame in the Cybernetic Fold: Reading Silvan Tomkins,” and “Paranoid 
Reading and Reparative Reading, or. You’re So Paranoid You Probably Think This Essay Is About You” in 
Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003).
 Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth, “An Inventory of Shimmers,” The Affect Theory Reader, ed. Melissa 4
Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 1.
 Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 12-13.5
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one pole of affect theory, influenced by the American psychologist Silvan Tomkins. 
Influenced by the works of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Brian Massumi, who 
represents the alternative pole of affect theory, is seemingly more circumspect about 
Foucault’s status as a thinker of affect. But even though Massumi borrows Foucault’s concept 
of “incorporeal materialism”  in thinking the potentiality (or virtuality) of the body on the 6
level of the material, his insistence on the transhistoricity of the physical, sensory, and bodily 
“field of immanence” is in stark contrast to Foucault’s claim that every feeling and sentiment, 
from the most bodily and instinctual to the “noblest and most disinterested, has a history.”   7
 There are a couple possible reasons for this distance between affect theory and the 
Foucauldian project. The first is related to a commonly perceived problem of agency and 
resistance in Foucault’s work. The translator’s introduction to Alain Badiou’s Infinite 
Thought (2003) articulates this criticism:  
Foucault argued that networks of disciplinary power not only reach into the most 
intimate spaces of the subject, but actually produce what we call subjects. However, 
Foucault also said that power produces resistance. His problem then became that of 
accounting for the source of such resistance. If the subject—right down to its most 
intimate desires, actions and thoughts—is constituted by power, then how can it be 
the source of independent resistance? For such a point of agency to exist, Foucault 
needs some space which has not been completely constituted by power, or a complex 
doctrine on the relationship between resistance and independence. However, he has 
neither.   8
Thus, without a theory of the complex relationship between agency, resistance, and 
independence, Foucault also cannot account for the autonomy or independence of the body 
itself. When he was interested in the body it was only as the mute plaything of power and 
 See Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham: Duke University Press, 6
2002), 5; Massumi, Ontopower: War, Powers, and the State of Perception (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2015), 49; and Michel Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” in Untying the Text: A Poststructuralist Reader, ed. 
Robert Young (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 69. 
 Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: 7
Pantheon, 1984), 87.
 Oliver Feltham and Justin Clemens, “An Introduction to Alain Badiou’s Philosopher,” in Infinite Thought: 8
Truth and the Return to Philosophy, ed. And trans. Oliver Feltham and Justin Clemens (London: Continuum, 
2004), 5.
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discourse, too confined in the routines of discipline to be itself invested with its own material 
force of agency.  And when he tried to think the agency of the body (as a site of resistance to 9
power, for instance) it was compromised by an inability to think outside the overly 
intellectualist framework of the “intentional and voluntary actions” that comprise the 
“technologies of the self” inherent in any ethics of self-constitution.  Nowhere in Foucault’s 10
oeuvre, it would seem, does one find rich descriptions of those parts of ourselves called 
affects, those “visceral forces beneath, alongside, or generally other than conscious 
knowing,” those “vital forces insisting beyond emotion” that “drive us toward movement, … 
or … leave us overwhelmed by the world’s apparent intractability.”  If affect is a “gradient 11
of bodily capacity,” then Foucault would appear to fail to address it explicitly, opting for an 
account of such capacity as either mired in power and discourse or subsumed within 
voluntarist and self-conscious action. 
 While this criticism of Foucault is simplistic, and I’m certainly not attributing it to 
affect theorists like Sedgwick and Massumi, it does retain some element of truth. Indeed, 
Foucault’s work does avoid such explicit descriptions of “visceral” and “vital forces” beyond 
conscious cognition and on the level of “bodily capacity.” This avoidance, however, is not 
because of neglect, but because of a suspicion of the kind of vitalism at play in a deep 
“subject of sensation” lurking beyond “conscious knowing” and in the physiological 
capacities of bodies, their forces and intensities. This kind of vitalist positivity would be 
incompatible with the negativity that Foucault attributes to discourse analysis at the end of 
The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969): “discourse is not life: its time is not your time; in it, 
 For example, Kate Soper has argued that Foucault’s theorization of the body as “discursively constructed” is 9
dangerously “anti-naturalist” and thus risks undermining “the feminist demand for a ‘reclamation’ of the body 
and the expression of an ‘authentic’ desire”; see Soper, “Productive Contradictions” in Up Against Foucault: 
Explorations of Some Tensions Between Foucault and Feminism, ed. by Caroline Ramazanoglu (Routledge: 
London, 1993), 32-33. While this is a perfectly valid criticism for many scholars influenced by Foucault, it is 
more complicated when it comes to Foucault himself. For while Soper stresses the danger of an absent reference 
to a pre-discursive reality of the body in Foucault’s work, Judith Butler charged Foucault with having an 
incoherent account of the social construction of the body because his vocabulary of “inscription” implied that 
there is an ontologically prior and pre-discursive reality of the body; see Butler, “Foucault and the Paradox of 
Bodily Inscriptions,” The Journal of Philosophy 86, no. 11 (1989): 601-607. In any case, Foucault’s claim that 
the body itself “constructs resistances” to such discursive inscriptions suggests that his historicism, while anti-
naturalist to an extent, is not a simple social constructionism; see Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 87.  
 See Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1990), 10. Hereafter 10
abbreviated as UP.
 Seigworth and Gregg, “An Inventory of Shimmers,” 1.11
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you will not be reconciled to death; you may have killed God beneath the weight of all that 
you have said; but don’t imagine that with all that you are saying, you will make a man that 
will live longer than he.”  Those shimmers of life—those visceral and vital forces—can only 12
find meaning in the void and nothingness of language that Foucault liked to call “the 
outside.”  Even more, the profound imbrication that Foucault recognizes between the body, 13
discourse, and power makes it difficult to see how an authentic agency and independent 
autonomy of bodily affect might arise. 
 One thing that I have come to appreciate in the course of my research is that 
Sedgwick and Massumi, in their respective turns toward affect, are in part attempting to work 
through the Foucauldian tension between agency and power. This may have much to do with 
Foucault, but perhaps more or less indirectly with the way Foucault had been read and taken 
up by a generation of theorists and scholars in the Anglo-American tradition of critical theory 
during the 1970s and 1980s. In 1995, when Massumi published “The Autonomy of Affect” 
and Sedgwick and Adam Frank published “Shame in the Cybernetic Fold” (to be included as 
the introduction to a selection of writings by Silvan Tomkins), what is clear is that they had 
become dissatisfied with the dominant assumptions of what had loosely been defined as 
“poststructuralism.” Sedgwick and Frank excoriate the antiessentialism underlying the 
poststructuralist approach, characterizing it at one point variously as “psychoanalytic, 
Marxist, Foucauldian.”  According to the kind of poststructuralist antiessentialism that they 14
criticize, any attempts to specify affects (as Tomkins does, with his eight or nine core affects 
 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge: And The Discourse on Language, trans. A. M. Sherdian  12
Smith (New York: Vintage, 2010).
 See Michel Foucault, “The Thought of the Outside,” in Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, ed. James D. 13
Faubion (New York: The New Press, 1998), 147-169. A renaming of his 1966 reflection on the works of 
Maurice Blanchot, “The Thought from Outside,” here Foucault is explicit in the movements of feeling involved 
in a thought that witnesses the undoing of the subject, leaving him or her bereft of any psychological interiority 
accessible to by words. One’s love for an other is borne to “a sweet and violent movement [that] intrudes on 
interiority, drawing it out of itself…. The instant that interiority is lured out of itself, an outside empties the 
place into which interiority customarily retreats and deprives it of the possibility of retreat: a form arises—less 
than a form, a kind of stubborn, amorphous anonymity—that divests interiority of its identity, hollows it out, 
divides it into noncoincident twin figures, divests it of its unmediated right to say I, and pits against its 
discourse a speech that is indissociably echo and denial” (163). 
 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank, “Shame in the Cybernetic Fold: Reading Silvan Tomkins,” in 14
Shame and Its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins Reader, ed. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1995), 15.
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including fear, anger, joy, and shame)  are considered morally suspect forms of biologism, 15
and the whole question of particular affects is disallowed in favour of an undifferentiated 
mass of affects, what they describe as simply another form of essentialism.  Massumi, for 16
his part, laments critical theory’s reluctance to think outside signification and structure and its 
consequent inability to conceive of affect as a truly autonomous source of change and 
becoming, at one point quipping, “divorce proceedings of poststructuralism: terminable or 
interminable?”  Both Sedgwick and Massumi evoke the Foucauldian problem of resistance 17
and agency by identifying affect as a source of resistance, creativity, and change, distinct 
from subjectivity and cognition and thus discourse, power, signification and all those familiar 
objects of poststructuralist analysis. What remains for them is to break with the 
poststructuralist creed in developing vocabularies (albeit divergent ones) for articulating the 
independence of affect. Before long, critics would consider Foucault a thinker who neglected 
the topic of affect, as if the whole turn to affect in the 1990s and early 2000s was not in part 
an attempt to work through a perceived tension in the Foucauldian playbook. 
 This encounter rests on the premise that Foucault is unable to think the agency of the 
body in relation to discourse and power and thus is unable to provide a suitable vocabulary 
for understanding the actual life of affect. But the question of why Foucault might have a 
problem with this particular account of affect is left unaddressed. Even more, the assumption 
that Foucault is unable to carve a space out for agency does not hold up to careful scrutiny of 
 According to Tomkins, there are eight (and later nine) primary affects, which can be combined with a variety 15
of psychological functions, images, and objects to create the wealth of human affective experience. While 
admitting that “there is today no consensus on what the primary affects are,” he suggests a set of affects that are 
distinguished by facial expressions, positive or negative experiences, and belonging to ranges of intensity: 
interest-excitement, enjoyment-joy, surprise-startle, distress-anguish, fear-terror, shame-humiliation, contempt-
disgust, anger-rage, eventually adding “dissmell,” distinct from disgust, with the publications of volume 2 and 3 
of Affect, Imagery, Consciousness (Shame and Its Sisters, 73-74). Paul Ekman will later expand this model with 
his research on universal emotions tied to distinct facial expressions; see his 1975 summarization of his research 
with Wallace V. Friesen, Unmasking the Face: A Guide to Recognizing Emotions from Facial Clues 
(Cambridge, MA: Malor Books, 2003). While much of the criticisms of Ekman are related to his 2007 SPOT 
airport security program for recognizing terrorists through behavioural and facial observation, there have been 
more trenchant critiques of his model as inherited from Tomkins; see Ruth Leys, “The Turn to Affect: A 
Critique,” Critical Inquiry Vol. 37 (Spring 2011): 434-472, and her critical response, “Facts and Moods: A 
Reply to My Critics,” Critical Inquiry 38.4 (2012): 882-891; as well as Lisa Feldman Barrett, How Emotions 
Are Made: The Secret Life of the Brain (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017).  
 Sedgwick and Frank, “Shame in the Cybernetic Fold: Reading Silvan Tomkins,” 19.16
 Brian Massumi, “The Autonomy of Affect,” Cultural Critique 31 (1995), 88.17
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his works, and it presumes that the conflict Foucault recognizes between power and agency 
or freedom is a theoretical problem and not a productive tension. 
 Lynne Huffer has been one critic to argue against the consensus that Foucault is not a 
thinker of affect.  For Huffer, Foucault’s historical methodology of genealogy represents an 18
ethical practice of freedom and eros, what she calls a “thinking-feeling,” which endeavours 
to make the present strange by undoing the modern subject.  Contrary to critics who see 19
Foucault as a non-affective thinker, Huffer suggests that Foucault can indeed be read as 
engaging in questions of affect, but in a way that binds thinking with a form of action and 
feeling (of which affect is an integral element) in the discursive division of truth and falsity, 
the play of power and resistance, and the relationship with oneself and others. For Foucault, 
Huffer argues,  
Thought cannot be separated from the life of feeling, eros, and the body. Ethics for 
him is about transformation—the transformation of the relation between subjectivity 
and truth, the transformation of the subject through practices of freedom in relation to 
others. Affect has a major role to play in this transformative, desubjectivating process. 
We do not tend to think of Foucault as a thinker who also engages with affect, but 
History of Madness gives us a lens through which to see how that happens—not only 
in Madness but in other places in his work.  20
How, then, might we read Foucault as a perceptive and insightful thinker of affect, despite 
what has become a general inability for many theorists to see him as such? If Foucault was 
always trying to push thought to the point where we are able to take account of what we are 
and endeavour to become otherwise, then what role does affect play in that “transformative” 
 For the past decade Lynne Huffer has been engaged in one of the most creative and original projects in 18
Foucauldian scholarship (and critical discourse more broadly). Her recent Foucault trilogy is nothing short of 
triumphant: a renewal for thinking and feeling about sex and ethics. See Huffer, Mad For Foucault: Rethinking 
the Foundations of Queer Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), Are The Lips A Grave? A 
Queer Feminist on the Ethics of Sex (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), and Foucault’s Strange 
Eros (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020). 
 “As one of the many strands of Foucault’s postmoral, Nietzschean critique of morality, eros names a thinking-19
feeling suspension of biopolitical sexuality. The strange eros we find in Foucault allows us to experience the 
sexual dispositif of our historical a priori in terms of its conditions for other possibilities, as biopower’s 
dissolution or rupture.” Lynne Huffer, “Strange Eros: Foucault, Ethics, and the Historical A Priori,” Continental 
Philosophy Review 49 (2016), 107.
 Lynne Huffer and Elizabeth Wilson, “Mad for Foucault: A Conversation,” Theory, Culture & Society 27 20
(2010), 331.
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and “desubjectivating process”? Even more, how might that lead us to reevaluate how we 
think about ourselves and our feelings, whether of an affective or an emotional register? After 
broaching these questions, Huffer quotes a resonant passage from Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
Daybreak (1881): “we have to learn to think differently—in order at last, perhaps very late 
on, to attain even more! to feel differently.”  21
~  
My argument is that Foucault, far from the way he is frequently read and taught, is a thinker 
of affect, but in a way that challenges how we tend to understand affect. I would contend that 
Foucault, instead of questioning the biological, social, and psychological dimensions of 
affect, is principally interested in its ethical dimension. In an interview from 1983, on the 
subject of his upcoming work on antiquity and the ethics of self-constitution, Foucault offers 
a breakdown of his analysis of ethics (borrowing roughly from Aristotle’s doctrine of the four 
causes ) that guides his subsequent studies in The Use of Pleasure (1984) and The Care of 22
the Self (1984). This ethics of self-constitution is divided as follows: (1) ethical substances, 
or the parts of ourselves most relevant for moral conduct such as pleasure or desire; (2) 
modes of subjectivation, or the way people see themselves as moral agents, i.e. via a 
cosmological, rational, or social order; (3) ascesis, or the actual practices we undertake in 
order to be moral, such as spiritual and moral practices like meditation, self-examination, 
monogamy, or confession; (4) telos, or the ultimate goal ascribed to moral behaviour, i.e. 
perfection, salvation, liberation, or self-mastery. Regarding ethical substances he remarks 
briefly that while in antiquity the substance of moral behaviour was pleasure (for Hellenistic 
cultures) and desire (for Christian cultures), for modern cultures of the West “the part of 
ourselves which is most relevant for morality is our feelings.”  For our morality, he is 23
saying, what matters less is how we experience pleasure or what or whom we desire, but how 
we actually feel towards others and towards ourselves. The way we understand ourselves as 
moral subjects, the actions we take, and the ethical goals we pursue, are undertaken with 
 Ibid. See also Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudice of Morality, ed. Maudmarie Clark 21
and Brian Leiter, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 103.
 As outlined in Aristotle’s Physics (194b 16-195b28) and Metaphysics (983a22-b7).22
 Michel Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of a Work in Progress,” in The Foucault Reader, 23
ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 352. 
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reference to a substantive foundation of feeling as the life or bios we construct. This 
proximity of ethics and feeling is the starting point and guiding thread for this thesis in 
conducting an “ontology of ourselves”  and a “history of the present” (DP 31).  24
 In Chapter One, I argue that while Foucault understands feeling as the ethical 
substance of modernity, part of what interests him about practices of the self in Greco-Roman 
antiquity is that feeling plays a more integral role for ethical practice or ascesis. In the 
examples, eros, epimeleia, and parrhēsia (which I characterize as comprised of feelings of 
love, care, and courage), I demonstrate how they integrate thinking and feeling as a way of 
giving style and art to life and existence. I characterize these as forms of feeling-practices or 
an ars pathetica. In Chapter Two, I track Foucault’s genealogies of the modern State and 
governmentality as they pertain to the shift from feeling-practices to the feeling-substances 
that Foucault believes belong to our morality. Unlike feeling-practices, feeling-substances 
represent the objectification and instrumentalization of feeling that creates the disciplined or 
self-disciplining subject. What emerges is a discussion of how the figuration of feeling as an 
ethical substance is accompanied by a growing anxiety and preoccupation in the modern age 
with the government of feeling, whether through disciplinary or biopolitical means. Finally, 
in Chapter Three, I unpack Foucault’s engagement with questions of affect in History of 
Madness (1961)  and his other archaeological analyses of modern medicine and the human 25
sciences, The Birth of the Clinic (1963) and The Order of Things (1966). Here I endeavour to 
describe a scientia affectus that represents the knowledge side of the power-knowledge nexus 
of the government of feeling. This scientia affectus eclipses and transplants the earlier ars 
pathetica, transforming the way the truth of feeling is produced, from the way the ars 
pathetica derives spiritual, ethical, or philosophical truth from feeling itself to the way the 
scientia affectus deploys scientific and governmental discourses in order to decipher in 
feeling a psychological or biological truth. I conclude by speculating what the role of a 
 See Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” In The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: 24
Pantheon, 1984), 32-50.
 Originally submitted as Foucault’s PhD dissertation, it was published in France in 1961 with the title Folie et 25
déraison: Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique (Madness and Unreason: History of Madness in the Classical 
Age). A heavily abridged version was published in English in 1964, with the title Madness & Civilization. The 
full 1961 text was not available in English until 2006 with the title History of Madness, which is the version I 
cite. 
8
memory of an ars pathetica  might mean for theorists today. Ultimately, my aim is to show 26
that Foucault’s concept of the subject is not a subject of feeling but a subject of technê, and 
that the ethical task of his critical histories is set on turning feelings into various ways: styles, 
arts. In turn, the point is to derive a truth and aesthetic of existence from feelings themselves 
rather than to decipher in them a moral, psychological, or biological truth. 
 In these three chapters I also open by staging an interlocutor on the topic of affect as a 
way of setting up a dialogue between Foucault and affect studies. Chapter One opens with a 
brief discussion of Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus (1980), specifically the 
sublation of their idiosyncratic distinction between affect and feeling in the figure of the 
martial artist. Chapter Two begins by discussing Sedgwick and her use of Tomkins’ affect 
theory as a supplement for understanding the complex degrees of freedom that she calls the 
“middle ranges of agency,” which she argues are not accounted for by Foucault. Instead I 
argue that Foucault did have a nuanced understanding of such “middle ranges of agency,” 
specifically in regard to questions of refusal and resistance, making the Tomkins supplement 
a problematic detour for a Foucauldian critique. Chapter Three turns to Massumi’s discussion 
of the relation between the individual and society in his extended metaphor of the soccer 
game in order to contest his exclusion of questions of the subject, art, style, and history. In 
staging these three dialogues, I hope to stress how contemporary affect theory, specifically in 
the case of Sedgwick and Massumi, is indebted to an attempt to think through a number of 
difficulties in Foucault’s work. While Sedgwick and Massumi initiate brilliant openings for 
thought in their own right, they have not worked through the tensions they intuit in Foucault, 
and instead open up further problems that Foucault had sought to avoid. Through staging 
these dialogues, my intention is not to show how Foucault offers a more coherent or less 
problematic vision of affect, but to preserve as much as possible the ambiguities at play in the 
 I adopt ars pathetica and its contrasting term, scientia affectus, directly from Foucault’s distinction between 26
ars erotica and scientia sexualis in The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1990). In my understanding, the formal distinction between these terms is a distinction between 
productions of truth; while for the ars erotica truth is derived from pleasure itself (WK 57), the scientia sexualis 
endeavours to decipher truth in pleasure, whether in the deep meaning of desire, obsession, or phantasy (WK 
69). The truth of the ars erotica becomes a secret truth because of the high esteem it is given, and the 
knowledge of pleasure entrusted to a master. On the contrary, the secret for a scientia sexualis is buried within 
pleasure and requires the subject to seek his or her own truth in pleasure, to decipher and speak that truth 
endlessly. Similarly, I distinguish ars pathetica and scientia affectus on the basis of a distinction between truth 
production: between ethical practices which derive truth from feeling and scientific discourses which decipher 
truth in the psychological or physiological substance of feeling. 
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dialogue between Foucauldian thought and affect theory. In any case, Foucault’s 
understanding of the subject—not as a subject of deep and unconscious feeling but as a 
subject of technê who uses or cares  for feelings in order to give sense, meaning, or truth to 27
the world and to oneself—makes him an insightful yet challenging interlocutor for affect 
theory. 
~  
A word about how I distinguish and categorize feeling from affect, emotion, and the passions 
is already overdue. Rei Terada offers a workable breakdown along the lines of a distinction 
between the physiological and the psychological:  
By emotion we usually mean a psychological, at least minimally interpretive 
experience whose physiological aspect is affect. Feeling is a capacious term that 
connotes both physiological sensations (affects) and psychological states (emotions). 
Although philosophers reserve "feeling" for bodily conditions, I use it when it seems 
fruitful to emphasize the common ground of the physiological and the psychological. 
Passion highlights an interesting phenomenon, the difficulty of classifying emotion as 
passive or active.  28
From a Foucauldian perspective the problem with such distinctions is that these terms 
fluctuate remarkably across history. While the association of affect with the physiological, or 
at least non-cognitive, seems sound, emotion is less than consistently associated with the 
purely psychological in modern philosophy and science of emotion. As Thomas Dixon has 
 I use the verbs “use” and “care” here with reference to Foucault’s understanding of the Greek words chresis 27
and epimeleia. While I discuss the latter and its role as an ars pathetica at length in the first chapter, chresis or 
khrēsis represents a form of use that is not purely instrumental but can be ethical as well. See Michel Foucault, 
The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France 1981-1982, ed. Frédéric Gros, trans. 
Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2005), 56: “The French word I employ here, ‘se servir’ [‘use’ in English-
G.B.], is actually the translation of a very important Greek verb with many meanings. This is the verb khrēsthai, 
with the substantive khrēsis. These two words are difficult and have had a lengthy and very important historical 
destiny. Khrēsthai (khraōmai: ‘I use’) actually designates several kinds of relationships one can have with 
something or with oneself. Of course, khraōmai means: I use, I utilize (an instrument, a tool), etcetera. But 
equally khraōmai may designate my behavior or my attitude.… Khrēsthai also designates a certain type of 
relationship with other people. When one says, for example, theois khrēsthai (using the gods), this does not 
mean that one utilizes the gods for any end whatever. It means having appropriate and legitimate relationships 
with the gods. It means honoring the gods, worshipping them, and doing what one should with them. The 
expression hippo khrēsthai (using a horse) does not mean doing what one likes with a horse. It means handling 
it properly and using it in accordance with the rules of the art entailed by the yoked team or the cavalry. 
Khraōmai: khrēsthai also designate a certain attitude towards oneself.”
 Rei Terada, Feeling In Theory: Emotion After the “Death of the Subject” (Cambridge MA: Harvard 28
University Press, 2001), 4-5.
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shown in From Passions to Emotions (2003), the concept of emotion emerged in the 
eighteenth century, mainly in the work of Scottish empiricists like David Hume and Thomas 
Brown (1778-1820), through the influence of René Descartes’s use of “émotion” (translated 
today not as “emotion” but “excitation”) in The Passions of the Soul (Les Passions de l’âme) 
(1649). In this work Descartes argues that the passions of the soul are rooted in the animal 
spirits’ excitations (or “émotions”) of the soul. Dixon argues that later empiricists follow 
Descartes in transforming the basically theological concept of the passions into a secular 
concept of emotion as the body’s “excitation” of the soul. Characterizing the more spiritual 
concept of the passions, Dixon writes, “theories of appetites, passions and affections … 
conceived of them as movements or acts of the will and intellect of a substantial soul. The 
passions were signs and symptoms of a disobedient fallen soul, and the affections were 
enlightened movements of the rational will. Gracious affections were the movements of a 
soul indwelt by the Holy Spirit.”  In contrast, eighteenth-century philosophers of emotion 29
began to use more physicalist terms: “‘emotions,’ from the outset, were involuntary: they 
were miniagents in their own right, rather than movements or actions of a will or self. They 
were, furthermore, non-cognitive states: they were to be contrasted with intellectual 
judgments and thoughts. They were, finally, aggregates reducible to physical feelings: they 
were ‘worked up from’ bodily sensations.”  If so, this would mean that the turn to affect in 30
critical theory is a late twentieth-century return to the concept of emotion in the eighteenth 
century. 
 When emotions became thought-based rather than sensation-based is somewhat 
difficult to discern. When affect theorists contrast affect to emotion in this way, they are 
likely, intentionally or not, responding to the wave of cognitivist theories of emotion that 
became prominent in the mid-twentieth century, as represented by philosophers like C.D. 
Broad  and Robert C. Solomon,  who see emotions as intentional or evaluative states or 31 32
 Thomas Dixon, From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category (Cambridge: 29
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 233.
 Ibid., 251.30
 See C. D. Broad, “Emotion and Sentiment,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 13.2 (1954): 31
203-214.
 See Robert C. Solomon, The Passions (New York: Doubleday, 1976).32
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judgments; that is, emotions have an “aboutness” irreducible to unconscious or physiological 
instincts. The Foucauldian approach, however, aims to historicize and contextualize this split 
between physiology and psychology in our understanding of emotions as either rooted in 
sensation and affect (determined by physiological mechanisms) or in thought and cognition 
(determined by psychological states). Indeed, this historicization is a dominant thread 
running through History of Madness in particular, and this it what I take Huffer to mean 
when she says that that book is a rich engagement with questions of affect, as long as we take 
affect to entail a specific historical understanding of man  and his relation to his own 33
“unreason,” a term which had long been understood as including the passions. Before the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and stretching as far back as Hippocratic and Galenic 
medicine, Foucault writes, the passions were “always the interface between body and the 
soul” and they insured the “reciprocal causality” of body and soul as mediated by the 
movements of the humours (HM 225-226). While Cartesian medicine shifted this relation in 
favour of a theory of the passions as determinate of any unity or disunity of body and soul, 
Foucault argues that Cartesian mind-body dualism had actually not yet been enough to apply 
it to anthropology or the concrete knowledge of man. On the contrary, Foucault gives a later 
date to the emergence of the split between the psychological and the physiological, for which 
it has become routine in critical theory to blame Cartesianism: 
The heterogeneity of the physical and the moral in medical thought was not a result of 
the Cartesian distinction between thinking and extended substances: a century and a 
half of post-Cartesian medicine had not been sufficient to accept this separation fully, 
both at the level of the problems it set out to solve and at that of its methods, nor to 
consider the distinction between substances as an opposition between the organic and 
the psychological. Cartesian or anti-Cartesian, classical medicine never ventured so 
far as to apply his metaphysical dualism to anthropology. And when the separation 
was made, it was not on account of some renewed faithfulness to the Meditations, but 
 Throughout my thesis I occasionally use “man” when referring to Foucault’s thought and writing, rather than 33
altering his term as the gender-inclusive “human.” For one, I do this because I am apprehensive about 
retroactively including other genders into a category that belongs to a largely male-centric worldview (in which 
Foucault himself was of course implicated) of what it means to be human. And second, I take Foucault’s 
reference to “man” specifically in The Order of Things (1966) to denote an eighteenth-/nineteenth-century 
discursive formation invented and brought into question by the human sciences. 
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rather owing to a renewed importance laid on the idea of the fault. Where the mad 
were concerned, only the practice of punishment separated the medicine of the body 
and the soul. A purely psychological medicine was only made possible when madness 
was alienated into guilt. (HM 326) 
Thus, the psychology-physiology split has more to do with the changing methods and 
practices of treatments for madness and mental illness than with Cartesianism. At the end of 
the eighteenth century, “moral therapy” for the mad emerged under the influence of William 
Tuke (1732-1822) in England and Philippe Pinel (1745-1826) in France. For Foucault, Tuke 
and Pinel did not represent a “more humane” form of treatment, as they had marketed 
themselves, but represented rather a form of treatment that instilled in the mad a moral fault 
that required moral therapy.  Many of the treatments for madness that had been in practice 34
since at least the sixteenth century remained unchanged but acquired different meanings. 
Treatments such as cold water immersion; the imbibing of certain salts, minerals, drugs, or 
natural remedies; purification of insalubrious vapours in the body or environment; or the 
regulations of bodily movements had long been believed to act on the body and soul as an 
integrated mixture, whether by affecting the balance of the humours that gave rise to passion 
or by simulating the natural movements and relations of reason. But by the beginning of the 
nineteenth century these same treatments, such as cold water immersion, became primarily 
used as forms of moral punishment,  or if not, treatments with a solely mechanical or 35
physical effect (HM 321). The figure of modern man, in Foucault’s account, then becomes an 
awkward double of himself, split between a psychological and a physiological determinism, 
precipitating a whole subsequent debate and aporia about the proper causes of not just 
madness and its relation to the individual, but in the relationship between the passions, 
affects, emotions, and feelings. 
 Historian Roy Porter, while critical of Foucault on the topic of the “great confinement,” basically agreed with 34
Foucault on the point that Tukean “moral therapy” did not represent a major break with previous, supposedly 
more repressive methods of interning the mad; see Roy Porter, “Foucault’s Great Confinement,” History of the 
Human Sciences 3.1 (1990), 50.
 In a 1981 inaugural lecture at the Catholic University of Louvain, Foucault discusses the therapeutic use of 35
cold showers by the nineteenth-century psychiatrist François Leuret. Foucault recounts a chilling exchange 
between the doctor and his patient, in which Leuret repeatedly drenches an inmate at the Bicêtre Hospital with 
freezing cold water, commanding the patient to admit that he is mad; see Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling: The 
Function of Avowal in Justice, ed. Fabienne Brion and Bernard E. Harcourt, trans. Stephen W. Sawyer 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 11-12.
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 Because of this historical mutability of categories of feeling, emotion, and affect, I 
employ the distinction between affect and emotion only as a reference to a specific historical 
situation. Like Terada, however, I often use “feeling” to refer to the grey-area middle ground 
between the physiological affect and the psychological emotion. My intention is to maintain 
the ambiguity between sensation and sentiment that, I hope, permits us to see past the 
historical split between psychology and physiology. The passions, then, represents a 
historical memory of this pre-split experience of body and soul and witnesses the ambiguity 
of subject and object, activity and passivity.  
 ~ 
One final word before beginning. Throughout this thesis I use a conventional periodization of 
Foucault’s early, middle, and late works. It is routine for Foucault scholars to divide his work 
between the early archaeological period, from History of Madness (1961) through to The 
Archaeology of Knowledge (1969); his middle genealogical period, from his inaugural lecture 
at the Collège de France, “The Order of Discourse” (1970), to the first volume of his history 
of sexuality, The Will to Knowledge (1976); and his late ethical period which includes the 
other two volumes The Use of Pleasure (1984) and The Care of the Self (1984) as well as the 
unpublished manuscripts of Les aveux de la chair.  The archaeological period is focused on 36
the historical analysis of knowledge and the conditions of possible experience. Genealogy 
then extends the analysis of knowledge to include power and is interested in the political, 
institutional, and discursive effects of the division of truth and falsity. The ethical period is 
focused on the subject and the social, spiritual, and moral practices and methods of self-
constitution. So, for this periodization there are three objects of analysis appropriate to each 
methodology: for archaeology, knowledge; for genealogy, power; for ethics, subjectivity.  
 One difficulty that any Foucault scholar encounters is how or if these three periods 
and their correlative methodologies and objects are reconcilable. The most common 
explanation is that they are in tension and contradiction with one another, and that Foucault’s 
movement from one to the next represents a series of attempts to work out an indelible 
problem with the earlier approach. This interpretation goes all the way back to Paul Rabinow 
 These manuscripts only saw the light of day in 2018. The English translation is set to be published in 36
February of 2021 by Pantheon Books.
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and Hubert Dreyfus’s Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (1982) and 
has found alternative iterations in Béatrice Han’s Foucault’s Critical Project (1998), and Eric 
Paras’s Foucault 2.0 (2006). Other variations of this approach see the first two periods as 
basically complimentary but with the third ethical period in marked contrast with the 
previous two, representing a last-ditch retreat to some form of liberal humanism. This 
interpretation was memorably argued by biographer James Miller in The Passion of Michel 
Foucault (1993). The other dominant approach sees the three periods and methodologies as a 
unified project, dating back at least to Deleuze’s 1986 tribute, Foucault, in which he attempts 
to open up a topology where knowledge, power, and subjectivation form a single core nexus 
of Foucault’s project. Thomas Flynn, in his second volume of Sartre, Foucault, and 
Historical Reason (2005) is more explicit in terming this approach an “axial reading” of 
Foucault in which knowledge, power, and subjectivity form a principle analytic triangulation 
for all of Foucault’s works, even if only one term may appear to be dominant at one time. 
 There is a third, somewhat less common, approach, which is basically in agreement 
with Foucault when he claims in 1982 that all along it was not power but the subject that was 
the “general theme” of his work.  This approach views Foucault as above all interested in 37
questions of ethics and the constitution of the subject. For this approach, James Bernauer 
S.J.’s Michel Foucault: Force of Flight (1990) is essential, for Bernauer understands 
Foucault as an ethical thinker interested in escaping a series of philosophical, political, and 
moral confinements that trap the subject in particular constrictions and images of knowledge 
and meaning, individual and social utility, and forms of self-subjugation.  This more 38
synthetic reading of Foucault has been advanced variously by Edward McGushin in 
Foucault’s Askesis (2007) and Lynne Huffer’s Mad for Foucault (2009). For my part, I am 
mostly following this third, synthetic approach. Admittedly, it runs the risk of eliding the 
tensions and ambiguities that pervade Foucault’s work, his slow developments, and frequent 
corrections to previous ideas. While early works like History of Madness and The Order of 
Things scarcely have an explicit ethical dimension, it is not difficult to see how they are 
 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” Critical Inquiry 8.4 (1982), 778.37
 James Bernauer S.J., Michel Foucault: Force of Flight, (New Jersey: Humanities International Press, 1990), 38
9.
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primarily interested in the historical developments of man’s “relation to the self,” as 
articulated in the 1961 preface to History of Madness.  While in the early archaeological 39
books Foucault understands this relation to the self as determined and pervaded by the moral 
space opened up by such disciplines as psychology, medicine, and the human sciences, in his 
later works he sees this relation to the self as the fundamental space of ethics, where subjects 
learn to know themselves, recognize some truth of themselves, and endeavour to behave and 
conduct themselves accordingly.  
 History of Madness is woven with the constant refrain of an ethical space of madness 
that emerges in the seventeenth century, so that it is clear that Foucault was interested in, 
even if only incidentally, a massive mutation in the ethical experience of European culture 
around the beginning of the modern age. No less, the ethical dimension of Foucault’s critical 
project is emphasized in his first published article in 1953, the introduction to the French 
translation of Ludwig Binswanger’s Dream and Existence (1930). There he alludes to an 
unnamed future project that would be a necessary “ethical task” and would perform an 
ontological analysis of history.  Thirty years later, approaching his death, he would repeat 40
the ethical necessity of this historical ontology in the 1984 article “What is Enlightenment?” 
in which he characterizes his project as a “philosophical ethos” that endeavours to conduct an 
“ontology of ourselves as a historico-practical test of the limits that we may go beyond, and 
thus as work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings.”  He also makes clear 41
that this ethical task of historical ontology is not just a way of thinking but also, importantly, 
a way of feeling:  
 Here, Foucault reflects on the transformation of madness from the inherent destiny and risk of all reason into 39
a positive objectification of a human psychological truth; what is at stake is a mutation in the relationship with 
the self: “Another effect of that figure was to lead man into a powerful forgetting; he was to learn to dominate 
that great division, and bring it down to his own level; and make in himself the day and the night, and order the 
sun of the truth to the pale light of his truth. Having mastered his madness, and having freed it by capturing it in 
the gaols of his gaze and his morality, having disarmed it by pushing it into a corner of himself finally allowed 
man to establish that sort of relation to the self that is known as ‘psychology.’ It had been necessary for Madness 
to cease being Night, and become a fleeting shadow within consciousness, for man to be able to pretend to 
grasp its truth and untangle it in knowledge” (HM xxxiv).
 Michel Foucault, “Dream, Imagination, Existence,” in Dream & Existence by Ludwig Binswanger, ed. by 40
Keith Hoeller, trans. by Jason Needleman (Seattle: Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, 1986) 74.
 Foucault, “What Is Enlightenment?” 47.41
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I wonder whether we may not envisage modernity rather as an attitude than as a 
period of history. And by ‘attitude,’ I mean a mode of relating to contemporary 
reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, a way of thinking and 
feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a 
relation of belonging and presents itself as a task. A bit, no doubt, like what the 
Greeks called an ethos.  42
Endeavouring to feel otherwise: this is how I understand Foucault’s ethics. In a 1980 
interview Foucault presents three elements of his ethics: “(1) the refusal to accept as self-
evident the things that are proposed to us; (2) the need to analyze and to know, since we can 
accomplish nothing without reflection and understanding—thus, the principle of curiosity; 
and (3) the principle of innovation: to seek out in our reflection those things that have never 
been thought or imagined. Thus: refusal, curiosity, innovation.”   43
 So, while I acknowledge the difficulties with the tripartite periodization of Foucault’s 
work belonging to archaeology, genealogy, and ethics, I employ it loosely for two reasons: 
(1) in starting with the later “ethical” work, I intend to foreground the ethical centrality of 
Foucault’s work; and (2) I aim to set up a historical chronology beginning with Classical 
Greece, following the Hellenistic and Roman periods, early Christianity, and then on to the 
modern periods. But while I have decided to divide this thesis between the late, middle, and 
early work, I have attempted to draw out the specifically ethical dimension in each period, 
according to each of the three ethical elements: curiosity, refusal, and innovation. These three 
elements comprise, in each chapter, an ethics and a way of feeling respective to each 
methodology: curiosity limns the boundaries of possible modes of subjectivation and agency, 
refusal underlines the possible sites of resistance to power and government, and innovation 
aims to undertake new aesthetics and truths of existence. These three ethics of feeling cohere 
to provide an understanding of agency and curiosity, refusal and resistance, and innovation 
and art. 
 Ibid, 39.42
 Michel Foucault, “Power, Moral Values, and the Intellectual,” History of the Present 4 (1998), 1.43
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Chapter One: Ars Pathetica and Ethics 
Very little truth is indispensable for whoever wishes to live truly and very little life is needed 
when one truly holds to the truth.  
— Foucault  44
1.1: The Gravity of Feeling  
In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari make a tenuous distinction between affect and 
feeling, divided between affect as an element of the “war machine” and feeling as the regime 
of work: 
The work regime is inseparable from an organization and a development of Form, 
corresponding to which is the formation of the subject. This is the passional regime of 
feeling as ‘the form of the worker.’ Feeling implies an evaluation of matter and its 
resistances, a direction (sens, also “meaning”) to form and its developments, an 
economy of force and its displacements, an entire gravity. But the regime of the war 
machine is on the contrary that of affects, which relate only to the moving body [fr: 
“au mobile”] in itself, to speeds and compositions of speed among elements. Affect is 
 From the manuscripts to a Collège de France lecture delivered on 29 February 1984 (CT 190).44
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the active discharge of emotion, the counterattack, whereas feeling is an always 
displaced, retarded, resisting emotion. Affects are projectiles like weapons; feelings 
are introspective like tools.  45
For Deleuze and Guattari, both affect and feeling have emotional and passional bases, but 
move in opposite directions, feeling tending toward the formation of the subject and affect 
advancing in the direction of undoing the subject. Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction between 
feelings and affects links up with a number of their distinctions between reterritorialzing and 
deterritorializing potentialities (i.e. the State apparatus and the war machine, tools and 
weapons, sedentarism and nomadism, projection and introception). In their idiosyncratic 
schematic, affects are discharges of emotion (according to a centrifugal and asubjective 
force) and feelings are resistant emotions (according to a centripetal and subjectifying force). 
Affect theory would eventually take up the mantle of a theory of centrifugal and asubjective 
emotions, of desubjectifying intensities, and deterritorializing potentialities.  But what if we 46
started from the other side? From a feeling theory instead of an affect theory, starting from 
the idea that feelings are centripetal emotions that involve a gravity of introception, self-
relation, and formation of the subject? Seeing as though Foucault, as he himself admits, was 
always interested in processes of subjectivation,  elaborations of various historical “forms of 47
reflexivity” that comprise the basis of subjectivity (HS 462), should we not then say that 
Foucault is interested in a theory of feeling involved in the formation of the subject? And 
what’s more, if Foucault understood subjectivation, or the relation to the self, as the field of 
contest for making and unmaking who we are, then what follows is an alternative path for 
affect theory: a feeling theory based not on the discharged emotions of affect but the 
introceptive gravity of feeling. It is not, then, through the projectile-movement of affect that 
desubjectivation occurs, but through the displacements of feeling that we find the 
 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian 45
Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 399-400.
 I am thinking mainly of the work and influence of Massumi, which I discuss at length in the third chapter. 46
Additionally, the affect theory of William E. Connolly in Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2002) is in a similar vein, but I do not take it up in this thesis. For a critique of 
these and similar non-subjective accounts of affect see Ruth Leys, “The Turn to Affect: A Critique,” Critical 
Inquiry Vol. 37 (Spring 2011): 434-472; and, for her broader critique, The Ascent of Affect: Genealogy and 
Critique (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017).
 Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 778.47
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possibilities for subjectivation and desubjectivation. Not the deterriotialization of the subject 
always awaiting a reterritorialization, but an introceptive gravity and reflexivity of emotion 
within an economy of forces that involves both the possibility and means of resistance for 
subject-formation.  
 However, beginning with a theory of feeling, in the way Deleuze and Guattari 
understand it, actually throws into question their own distinction between feeling and affect. 
Directly following their discussion, they consider martial arts as a practice that involves an 
indiscernible mixture of feeling and affect. On the one hand, affect allows the martial artist to 
“‘unuse’ weapons as much as one learns to use them,” and in “learning to undo things,” “to 
undo oneself, … the undoing of the subject.”  But on the other hand, “the martial arts 48
continually invoke the center of gravity and the rules for its displacement” or in other words 
the “regime of feeling” and the consequent formation of the subject. But this formation is not 
that of the worker following a code (i.e. a moral or disciplinary code); rather, the martial arts 
“follow ways.”  While these “ways” are “subject to gravity,”  or to feeling, this gravity of 49 50
feeling must be “transcended in the void,” meaning that these “ways” or arts of feeling 
transcend their own corporeal gravity by becoming related to the soul.  This is a gravity that 51
appears now rather twisted, caught in a movement of reflexivity, and tending downward 
toward the body only to be apprehended by the soul and refashioned as a “way” or style. In 
this sense, the gravity of feeling is transcended by an art of feeling or what I call an ars 
pathetica. This ars pathetica, then, would neither entail affect nor feeling as an oppositional 
dualism, but rather a way or a practice in which any distinction between, say, strictly 
corporeal affects and purely subjective feelings is dissolved in favour of a form of 
relationality and reflexivity specific to an art. It is within this space of art and practice, that 
affect’s “undoing” of the subject becomes another kind of stylization of the subject, albeit in 
a more rarefied form; and conversely, feeling’s formation of the subject (which might exist in 
an alternative regime of the disciplined worker, soldier, or student) becomes itself a kind of 
 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 400.48
 Ibid.49
 Ibid, 561n80.50
 Ibid.51
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undoing. The gravity of feeling thus gains a transcendental function with regard to the 
subject’s possibility of giving the self a form, undoing the self, or rarefying the self, via the 
practice of ars pathetica. As we will see in the second and third chapters, the scientia affectus 
will then satisfy this transcendental function with the empirical contents of an objectifying 
discourse, in turn instrumentalizing feeling as an object of power and government. 
 So, rather than emphasize affect as an asubjective becoming, feeling emerges in this 
chapter as an inter- and intra-subjective field of self-practice or ascesis, dynamic ways of 
relating to oneself and to others in a way that can be described by what Foucault names 
“curiosity”: “not the curiosity that seeks to assimilate what is proper for one to know, but 
which enables one to get free of oneself” (UP 8). It is a curiosity about whether it is not 
possible to think, perceive, and feel differently. Such a curiosity, I argue, is charged with 
feeling, but not in an abstract way that would be reducible to a psychology of cognition or 
physiology of the body. This curiosity to free oneself from what one thinks and perceives and 
feels is in fact the “living substance of philosophy,” a mode of philosophy that Foucault finds 
in its original form in ancient Greece and Rome. What, then, is the relation between 
categories of feeling and philosophy as a form of “ascesis” or the “exercise of oneself in the 
activity of thought” (UP 9)? How does feeling as a practice for thought and an exercise of the 
self confer on the subject a sense of agency and freedom?  
 A Foucauldian theory of feeling begins with the nebulous concept of what I am 
calling feeling-practices  or various kinds of ars pathetica. The feeling-practices that I will 52
talk about are eros, epimeleia and parrhēsia; or love, care, and courage. These are feelings 
 My concept of feeling-practices shares some resemblance with Monique Scheer’s “emotional practices,”  52
specifically with regard to the historical dimensions Scheer attributes to such practices. See “Are Emotions a 
Kind of Practice (and Is That What Makes Them Have a History)? A Bourdieuian Approach to Understanding 
Emotion,” History and Theory Vol. 51 (May 2012): 193-220. But whereas her concept is rooted in Pierre 
Bourdieu’s habitus, I take my concept from Foucault’s discussion of ethical practices or ascesis in The Use of 
Pleasure. In any case, there is a rough agreement between these two concepts when Scheer gives three 
implications for “emotional practices”: “the use of the term ‘emotional practices’ should imply 1) that emotions 
not only follow from things people do, but are themselves a form of practice, because they are an action of a 
mindful body; 2) that this feeling subject is not prior to but emerges in the doing of emotion; and 3) that a 
definition of emotion must include the body and its functions, not in the sense of a universal, pristine, biological 
base, but as a locus for innate and learned capacities deeply shaped by habitual practices” (220). My only 
emendation to this breakdown would be that, for Foucault, the body is not reducible to “innate and learned 
capacities” and “habitual practices” but is more accurately ascribed to a changing field of experience and locus 
of non-identity: “nothing in man—not even his body—is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-
recognition or for understanding other men” (“Nietzeche, Genealogy, History,” in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul 
Rabinow (New York: Vintage Books, 2010), 87-88). 
21
that are tools for social cohesion and self-transformation rather than the feeling-substances 
that in the modernity become the objects of discipline, biopower, and governmental control 
in tandem with a scientia affectus. Feeling-practices involve a dynamic relationality of 
feeling that obtains in the auto-invention of the self, within complex social arrangements and 
relationships of affinity. This would include relationships of love and affection; spiritual and 
monastic forms of guidance and practices of self-mastery and salvation; and revolutionary or 
artistic pronouncements of transformative truths.  Unlike feeling-practices, feeling-53
substances represent the organization of emotional and affective material for particular social 
roles and functions that become increasingly more rigid, disciplined, and administered in 
modernity. Feeling-practices derive truth from feeling itself and endeavour to give existence 
style and art, whereas feeling-substances decipher truth in emotion and affect and entail 
efforts to manage and optimize feeling. While Foucault looks to antiquity as a source for 
understanding feeling-practices, he sees the subsequent lineage of feeling-practices like 
parrhēsia in Christian mystic traditions of late antiquity and the middle ages,  in modern 54
revolutionary movements beginning in the nineteenth century,  and in the radicalism of 55
modern art beginning at the end of the eighteenth century.  In these three examples—56
mysticism, militantism, and modern art—ways of life are taken to be a courageous source for 
truth, and an ethical practice of feeling becomes the requirement for truth. 
 Lida Maxwell has recently developed Foucault’s concept of parrhēsia to argue that modern-day 53
whistleblowers, such as Chelsea Manning, employ a form of speech-practice called “transformative truth-
telling.” See Maxwell, “Truth in Public: Chelsea Manning, Gender Identity, and the Politics of Truth-Telling,” 
Theory & Event Vol. 18, Iss. 1 (2015): N/A. 
 Discussing the “parrhesiastic pole” of Christian mysticism, in contrast to the more austere forms of Christian 54
asceticism, Foucault says, “Parrhēsia is also the confidence one has in God’s love and in how one will be 
received by Him on the Day of Judgement. Around this conception of parrhēsia crystallized what could be 
called the parrhesiastic pole of Christianity, in which the relation to the truth is established in the form of a face-
to-face relationship with God and in a human confidence which corresponds to the effusion of divine love. It 
seems to me that this parrhesiastic pole was a source of what could be called the great mystical tradition of 
Christianity” (CT 337).
 Speaking on the relationship of Cynic parrhēsia and the “revolutionary life,” Foucault remarks, “Cynicism, 55
the idea of a mode of life as the irruptive, violent, scandalous manifestation of the truth is and was part of 
revolutionary practice and of the forms taken by revolutionary movements throughout the nineteenth 
century” (CT 183).
 On the relationship of Cynic parrhēsia and modern art: “the idea that art itself, whether it is literature, 56
painting, or music must establish a relation to reality which is no longer one of ornamentation, or imitation, but 
one of laying bare, exposure, stripping, excavation, and violent reduction of existence to its basics…. Art 
(Baudelaire, Flaubert, Manet) is constituted as the site of the irruption of what is underneath, below, of what in 
culture has no right, or at least no possibility of expression” (CT 188). 
22
 Despite these exceptions, the long genealogy reveals that feeling-practices have 
increasingly become more and more marginal, while feeling-substances have become the 
norm. While feeling-practices and feeling-substances both open up a space of relationality, 
change, and transformation, feeling-substances involve a completely different economy of 
forces than feeling-practices, different relations of power, related more to the disciplinary 
requirements of capitalism, to a self-ascesis geared more toward following a moral code or 
maximizing one’s productivity and utility. While neoliberalism has entailed the relaxation of 
strict moral codes and much more flexible and covert ways of managing and normalizing 
feeling-substances, the invention of new ethical feeling-practices exists only as a fleeting 
memory haunting the margins of contemporary thought and literature. In the years before his 
death, Foucault began talking about the need, in the present, to invent new modes of ethics 
that do not require a strict adherence to a moral code, a form of ethics that he dated to a pre-
Christian era and which he called an “aesthetics of existence”: “if I was interested in 
Antiquity it was because, for a whole series of reasons, the idea of morality as obedience to a 
code of rules is now disappearing, has already disappeared. And to this absence of morality 
corresponds, must correspond, the search for an aesthetics of existence.”  Elsewhere he 57
gives this search a crucial ethical dimension that he sees as lacking in the activist and 
progressivist movements of his day: “recent liberation movements suffer from the fact that 
they cannot find any principle on which to base the elaboration of a new ethics. They need an 
ethics, but they cannot find any other ethics than an ethics founded on so-called scientific 
knowledge of what the self is, what desire is, what the unconscious is, and so on.”  I take 58
this need to be all the more urgent since Foucault’s death. For new ethics, aesthetics of 
existence, and transformations in the way we relate to ourselves are needed in order to 
develop the complex collective agency needed for addressing planetary crises such as 
anthropogenic climate change or, as made clear with the recent example of COVID-19, 
deadly pandemics. 
 Michel Foucault, “An Aesthetics of Existence” in Politics, Philosophy Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 57
1977-1984, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York: Routledge, 1988), 49.
 Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” 343.58
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 And so the point at which I’d like to begin my discussion of feeling-practices in 
Foucault’s account of ancient technologies of the self is agency. Feeling-practices represent a 
kind of ethical ascesis, and my first point is that the component of feeling involved in such 
practices confers a sense of agency onto the subject. Ethics for Foucault is comprised by the 
relationship with the self, the way the subject understands the truth of their existence and the 
potential to create their own values, ideals, and sense of truth. This is what is meant by the 
ancient Greek word “ethopoesis”: the creation of one’s own ethos or way of being (HS 237). 
Feeling-practices involve the self’s introceptive reflexivity of emotion: a form of ascesis that 
“transforms oneself into the ethical subject of one’s behaviour” (UP 27) through, for 
example, ethopoetic practices of eros, epimeleia, or parrhēsia. As opposed to the feeling-
substances of modernity, the ethical substances of antiquity were comprised by pleasure, in 
the case of the classical age of Greece in the fourth century BCE, and desire, as seen in the 
first and second centuries CE in Hellenistic Rome and the early Christians beginning in the 
fourth century CE. For the Greeks of the classical age there was an anxiety textured into the 
ethical experience regarding the appropriate uses (chrēsis) of pleasure (aphrodisia), of what 
kinds or degrees of pleasure are proper for an ethical subject, and of how one ought to 
practice self-mastery or self-restraint (enkrateia) in order to attain the ideal of moderation 
(sōphrosynē) (UP 37). In contrast, the ethical experience of philosophers, physicians, and 
moralists of the Roman Empire, and more intensely for the early Christians and Church 
Fathers, sees a shift in substance from pleasure to desire, from considering the appropriate 
moderation of pleasure to a tightening code of acceptable and prohibited forms of desire (CS 
41). For Foucault this shift means an intensification of the relationship to the self and a 
correlative rise in cultural practices of self-examination, individualism, and eventually for the 
Christians, confession. 
 While for the ancients ethical practices involved feelings and ethical substances 
concerned bodily pleasures and desires, modernity has totally reversed this order. For 
modernity ethical substances involve feelings,  feelings to be managed, regulated, 59
disciplined, or conversely, liberated. And beginning in the nineteenth century, ethical 
practices begin to involve sexuality, the kinds of pleasures and desires engaged in that 
 Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” 352.59
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ostensibly constitute ethical behaviour and ethical subjectivity. This shift is correlative with a 
whole historical intensification, biopoliticization, and sexualization of the body as an integral 
composite of practices that determine the formation of the modern subject. This reversal in 
the long history of feelings from practices to substances reflects the historical developments 
of discourse, knowledge and truth; the growing power relations of the government of feeling; 
and the subject’s exercise of agency. For Foucault, however, antiquity provides a rich source 
for understanding the ethical agency of the subject. Speaking on the philosophical theme of 
“the care of the self,” or epimeleia heautou, Foucault asks, “what is ethics, if not the reflexive 
practice of freedom?”  The subject, which is nothing other than the form of the relationship 60
with the self, is constituted through the ethical agency involved in reflexive subjectivation. 
While modern government and discipline function through exerting force on the subject’s 
reflexivity so as to influence action and determine subjectivating effects, this always occurs 
through an agonistic interplay with the subject’s ethical agency. In presupposing the freedom 
of the subject, the task of power and governmentality par excellence is not to effectuate 
forms of what Étienne de la Boétie famously dubbed “voluntary servitude,” but to seek new 
ways of strategically apprehending the gravity of feeling, the “recalcitrance of the will,” and 
the “intransigence of freedom.”  The aim is to arrest the radical potential of subjectivation, 61
to compel compliance.  
 The economy of force relations in antiquity, however, were markedly different. The 
asymmetry of freedom between land-owning men and women, slaves, and children ensured 
that only land-owning men could properly be ethical subjects, as agential subjects of their 
own behaviour and action. Where there is slavery, however, there is no power, only 
 Michel Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom” in Ethics: Subjectivity and 60
Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997), 284.
 Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 790. 61
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violence,  and consequently ethical agency was drastically restricted for non-citizens. The 62
brutal patriarchal society of classical Greece guaranteed the ethical agency of land-owning 
male citizens on the basis of slavery and violence against women. As a slave society, with 
dissymmetrical social relations between men and women, and in which the other is often 
excluded from ethical consideration,  the Hellenistic model is far from an ideal, and 63
Foucault made no pretensions of wanting to return to such a society. This should go without 
saying. But in elaborating an ethics as an aesthetic of the self, as a series of practices that take 
the individual as a work of art, of making ethics a technê of the self, Foucault’s genealogy of 
ethics represents a historicization of the modern determination of feeling-substances as 
objects of discourse, discipline, and government. This is to say, ethical subjectivation can 
always be otherwise than the modern biopoliticization of the subject as a simple living 
organism, consequently throwing into question the modern centrality of sexuality in subject-
formation via which sex is medicalized and the body is sexualized.  Because of the 64
intensifications of the ethics of subjectivation that biopower aims to achieve, with that of the 
self-disciplining, self-optimizing individual, subjectivation is always going to be a point of 
struggle and contest, giving significance to ethical practices of freedom that fashion an other 
 Ibid. While violence is generally considered a precondition or effect of power, Foucault maintains an analytic 62
distinction between power and violence even while they often overlap. They are not, however, identical. 
Sometimes violence is directed against a relationship of power (i.e. revolution, coup, etc.), and sometimes 
violence is used in order to maintain a set of power relations that is giving way to open confrontation (i.e. 
violent State repression, police brutality, etc.). Foucault: “in effect, what defines a relationship of power is that it 
is a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: an 
action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future. A relationship 
of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks on the wheel, it destroys, or it closes 
the door on all possibilities” (“Subject and Power” 789); power, however, endeavours to direct, conduct, and 
govern possibility.   
 Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” 346.63
 For Foucault, the biopolitical control of the individual occurs by way of the medicalization of sex and the 64
sexualization of the body as a principle of its docility and objectivity. Medicine makes sex knowable, treatable, 
manageable as a natural phenomenon, while sexualization articulates a power now internal to the body and its 
mechanisms. By the nineteenth century, “medicine made a forceful entry into the pleasures of the couple: it 
created an entire organic, functional, or mental pathology arising out of ‘incomplete’ sexual practices; it 
carefully classified all forms of related pleasures; it incorporated them into the notions ‘development’ and 
instinctual ‘disturbances’; and it under took to manage them” (WK 41). Meanwhile, sexuality has become a 
principle of intensification of the body as an object of knowledge; “sexuality is tied to recent devices of power; 
it has been expanding at an increasing rate since the seventeenth century; the arrangement that has sustained it is 
not governed by reproduction; it has been linked from the outset with an intensification of the body—with its 
exploitation as an object of knowledge and an element in relations of power” (WK 107).
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sort of relation to the self.  And feelings are central to the ethic of curiosity which 65
endeavours to be, think, and feel otherwise: the obstinacy of the subject’s efforts “to get free 
of oneself,” for, Foucault asks, “what would be the value of the passion for knowledge if it 
resulted only in a certain amount of knowledgeableness and not, in one way or another and to 
the extent possible, in the knower's straying afield of himself?” (UP 8). It is a curiosity that 
takes “care … of what exists and what might exist,” “a certain determination to throw off 
familiar ways of thought and to look at the same things in a different way,” “a passion for 
seizing what is happening now and what is disappearing,”  a question, in other words, of the 66
subject’s relation to the self and to truth. In turn, the passions of care and curiosity for the 
present and past interrupt thought and make possible its renewal.  
1.2: Ancient Ars Pathetica: Eros, Epimeleia, and Parrhēsia 
In turning to feeling as an ethical practice, what better way to begin than with Plato? Both 
Plato and his fellow student of Socrates, Xenophon, take up a similar problematic of eros 
rooted in the asymmetries of pleasures between the erastes (the lover) and the eromenos (the 
beloved) and the potential shame brought about for the eromenos. How is the younger male 
to be shown respect and treated with honour and dignity within what was considered an 
asymmetrical economy of pleasure? Under what conditions, and with what aim, is eros to be 
honourable? And how is the honour and freedom of the other to be understood and 
respected? Xenophon’s Socrates draws a strict line between the bad love of the body and the 
good love of the soul (UP 233). Plato, however, does not pose the question of eros in a way 
that transfigures eros as philia, the idea that good love, as opposed to bad love, is aimed at 
the bonds of friendship predicated on “a life in common, reciprocal attention, kindness to one 
another, and shared feelings” (234). On the contrary, Foucault argues that Plato refuses to 
 Jeffrey Nealon, in Foucault Beyond Foucault (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008) argues a similar 65
point: that Foucault’s turn to the ethics of subjectivation is not a turn away from analyses of power and 
knowledge, but an attempt to understand modes of resistance to biopower and neoliberalism’s intensifications of 
the self. In interpreting ancient technologies of the self, the point is not to return to a previous relation to the self 
but to overcome the present one.
 Michel Foucault, “The Masked Philosopher,” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: 66
The New Press, 1997), 325.
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trace a clear line between a bad love of the body and a good love of the soul (UP 238); for as 
Pausanias says in the Symposium, love, “considered in itself,” is neither “good or bad, 
honorable or shameful.”  Instead, Plato asks “what it means to love” (236). Plato’s interest is 67
then not the inferiority of the body, or good or bad acts of love, but the nature and form of 
love and its relation to truth, thus displacing the problems of the asymmetries of pleasure. 
Love’s relation to truth comprises a searching ethics of eros that recognizes the freedom of 
the other and “an ascesis of the subject and a common access to truth” (244). Love as a form 
of ethical ascesis becomes a restless questioning of the true nature of love and the truth to 
which the soul of the lover is related. Eros is a feeling-practice or ars pathetica that does not 
renounce the love of the body or disqualify love between men, but gives style, form, and a 
certain value to love as a relation to truth (245).  
 In this way, Foucault’s discussion of Platonic eros poses the question regarding the 
relation between the subject and truth. Eros as an ethical ascesis or work upon the self opens 
a series of questions regarding the reciprocity between love and pleasure, the essential 
struggle with oneself as a subject of inquiry, and the slow and “gradual purification of a love 
that is addressed only to being per se” (UP 245). Given this Platonic series of questions, the 
subject of love becomes a possible site of inquiry into the truth of one’s desires. And while 
for Plato this has the effect of establishing a link between the subject and truth and thus of 
opening up eros as an ethical domain of ascesis and self-transformation, Foucault argues that 
this also opens the way for a new ethical problematization of love that would make possible a 
more Christian ascesis and skepticism regarding eros in itself, as we shall see with early 
Christian mechanisms of fear and shame in Chapter Two. But in its original Platonic 
iteration, this erotic ascesis can be viewed as posing a question regarding the relation of the 
subject to the truth of being, time, and death. Platonic eros, Foucault argues, is linked to a 
“perception of time” as a hastening approach toward death and the correlative finitude of the 
subject (UP 252). This perception of fleeting time is what allows the freedom of the other to 
be posed in love’s relation to truth (Ibid). If eros desires immortality, as Diotima famously 
 Plato, Symposium, in Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing,   67
1997), 181a. 
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says in the Symposium,  then this is only because love represents a fleeting passage in the 68
space “in between” immortality and mortality, a space of movement, relationality, and 
transition that stages the subject’s struggles with truth and the activity of an ars pathetica that 
aims to give birth to new modes of subjectivation and new feelings. This represents above all 
a way of questioning more directly the truth of the finite and mortal subject and the freedom 
of the other. Truth is derived from the passional movement of eros between the self and other, 
life and death, time and immortality; here, eros is a transcendental condition of truth about 
existence.  
 The next key feeling-practice that Foucault discusses in his late work is epimeleia 
heautou or the care of the self. Foucault’s discussion of the care of the self follows two lines: 
one focused on the forms of ethical and spiritual subjectivation that proliferated in Hellenistic 
Greece and Imperial Rome under the influence of Pythagoreanism, Neo-Platonism, Stoicism, 
and Epicureanism; and the other relating more directly to an earlier Socratic iteration of the 
care of the self and the care of life as the basis for self-knowledge and primary directive of 
philosophy. After Plato’s questioning of the truth of eros throws into relief the question of the 
subject, the care of the self in the first and second centuries CE represents an intensification 
of the subject as a domain of ethical ascesis. Against the background of a series of political 
transformations in Rome during the first two centuries relating to the dissolution of the 
Roman Republic and the establishment of the Roman Empire, Foucault observes widespread 
intensification of the personal as site of social and ethical practice: “whereas formerly ethics 
implied a close connection between power over oneself and power over others, and therefore 
 “‘You see, Socrates,’ [Diotima] said, ‘what Love wants is not beauty, as you think it is.’ 68
‘Well, what is it, then?’
‘Reproduction and birth in beauty.’
‘Maybe,’ I said.
‘Certainly,’ she said. ‘Now, why reproduction? It’s because reproduction goes on forever; it is what mortals have in 
place of immortality. A lover must desire immortality along with the good, if what we agreed earlier was right, that 
Love wants to possess the good forever. It follows from our argument that Love must desire immortality’ (Symposium, 
207a). Of course, Plato does not wish to discount homosexual love or any love that does not have copulation or actual 
reproduction as its goal, instead opting for reproduction in immortality as a metaphor for the soul’s relational activity 
of self-begetting: “‘reproduction … always leaves behind a new young one in place of the old. Even while each living 
thing is said to be alive and to be the same—as a person is said to be the same from childhood till he turns into an old 
man—even then he never consists of the same things, though he is called the same, but he is always being renewed 
and in other respects passing away, in his hair and flesh and bones and blood and his entire body’” (207d-e). Here 
Diotima makes explicit the connection between this love for immortality and the mutability of feeling, or an ars 
pathetica that gives birth to feeling in beauty: “‘And it’s not just in his body, but in his soul, too, for none of his 
manners, customs, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, or fears ever remains the same, but some are coming to be in 
him while others are passing away’” (Ibid).
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had to refer to an aesthetics of life that accorded with one’s status, the new rules of the 
political game made it more difficult to define the relations between what one was, what one 
could do, and what one was expected to accomplish” (CS 84). This sociopolitical 
transformation is reflected in the more personal regions of the lives, truths, and conduct of 
individuals as a “crisis of the subject” or a “crisis of subjectivation” (95). Accompanying this 
curtailment of the political horizons and directives of individuals is a correlative swell in the 
social esteem of philosophy as a set of discourses and practices related to the spiritual 
development of the individual and the cultivation of the self as an ethical practice. This 
period saw the proliferations of schools, lectures, and new professional classes devoted to the 
spiritual direction of individuals, in addition to a more diffuse extension of social relations of 
“kinship, friendship, and obligation” (52-53). This is all to say, not that the care of the self 
entails an isolated subject working on herself in a purely personal zone, but instead that the 
care of the self represents a form of ethical ascesis and individual cultivation that is 
integrated within a complex field of social relations. The care of the self is thus as much a 
collective care as an individual care. 
 Foucault traces the historical developments of the care of the self in the first two 
centuries CE as a form of ethical subjectivation that prefigures later moral developments in 
Christianity, insofar as the care of the self entails a more intensified vigilance and 
problematization of pleasure and desire. But while the care of the self becomes the central 
theme of philosophy and spiritual exercise in Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Cynicism, 
Foucault remarks that it had originally been “consecrated by Socrates” (CS 44). Foucault 
finds this earlier iteration of the care of the self in the Platonic dialogues, the Alcibiades I, the 
Laches, and the Phaedo. In the Alcibiades I, Socrates relates the care of the self to the much 
more canonical maxim of gnothi seauton or “know thyself”: in order to lead and govern well, 
Socrates tells the eponymous Athenian statesman, you must first know yourself and take care 
of yourself. In Foucault’s reading, the Alcibiades I makes self-knowledge and the care of the 
self mutually dependent, meaning that rationality and knowledge are deeply entangled with a 
spiritual ethos of care. In contrast, later philosophical traditions will separate more cleanly 
the spiritual exercise of care from the epistemological activity of knowledge (HS 76-77). 
Similarly, while in the Alcibiades I a certain love between the master and the disciple is a 
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requirement for care and knowledge, the erotics, love, and pleasure of care will gradually 
disappear from the philosophical practice of care (76). But there are multiple valences of the 
care of the self even in Plato’s oeuvre. While the Alcibiades I stresses the care of the self as a 
care of the soul, the soul as what we call today the subject of action, behaviour, and 
reflexivity,  and that leads to the contemplation of the divine element of human existence, 69
the Laches presents a care of the self which would be a care of life (bios) as a practice and art 
of existence (CT 127). In any case, what interests Foucault is how care, in its Platonic 
articulation, is profoundly linked to love and knowledge and poses the question of the truth 
of the subject, the soul, and life. 
 Foucault takes the example of Socrates in the Phaedo to think at length about how 
care, like eros, relates to the other and to mortality. Influenced by his mentor Georges 
Dumézil’s discussion of the Phaedo in his book on Plato, Le Moyne noir en gris dedans 
Varenne (1984) Foucault interprets Socrates’ last words as an implicit evocation of the care of 
the self. Moments after drinking the hemlock, his body slowly going cold from his feet up, 
Socrates mutters to his followers at his bedside, “Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius. Pay the 
debt, don’t forget.” Enigmatic to be sure. Ancient commentators surmised that Socrates was 
simply delirious and babbling nonsense, perhaps the greatest irony for the wisest man of 
Athens.  Modern scholars in contrast have given more weight to these words. Nietzsche 70
argued for one of the more common modern interpretations: “This ridiculous and terrible 
‘last word’ means for those who have ears: ‘O Crito, life is a disease.’”  Asclepius is the god 71
of medicine and it was customary to make an offering to him as thanks for being cured of a 
disease; so of what disease was Socrates being cured in his dying moments? Nietzsche’s 
answer: “Socrates suffered life!”   72
 Foucault argues that the discussion of the soul in the Alcibiades I is not a substance but a subject; “It is only 69
the soul as such which is the subject of the action; the soul as such uses the body, its organs and its tools 
etcetera”; “it is not at all the soul-substance [Plato] discovers, but rather the soul-subject” (HS 56-57).   
 Emily Wilson, The Death of Socrates (London: Profile Books, 2007), 116-117.70
 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), 340.71
 But as Foucault remarks, this is actually a very traditional reading; it had been echoed earlier by the poet 72
Lamartine (1790-1869) and included as a note in the French edition of the Phaedo by classicist Léon Robin (CT 
97). But Nietzsche himself even observed that Socrates was not as pessimistic as to say that life is a disease and 
death is the cure. And Foucault follows Dumézil in sharing this scepticism.
31
 Against the pessimistic reading that life is a disease, Foucault argues that Socrates’ 
disease is error and the cure is care. Given the common analogy in classical Greece between 
the philosophical activity of epimeleisthai and medical care and concern (CT 110), this is not 
an unlikely possibility. This analogical relation is what Foucault might have called a 
“discursive dispersion”  that finds care evoked in a temporal connection with medicine, 73
health, philosophy, and knowledge. In addition Foucault reads an element of piety, for 
epimeleisthai was also used to refer to the way the gods cared for humans and the care 
humans gave to themselves and their relations with the gods (110). Care draws a diagonal 
between the medical care of life that leads to health, the philosophical care of the soul that 
leads to self-knowledge, and the divine care that transpires between humans and the gods. 
And just as eros was linked to a question of death and finitude, epimeleia registers an 
inevitable death, the need to take care even in death, and a transcendence of finitude in the 
way care, like eros, desires a certain immortality. While Nietzsche interprets Socrates’ last 
moments as exposing the secret of his teachings—that his idealism and his doctrine of the 
soul concealed only a deep hatred of life—Foucault reads the last words against the grain as a 
summarization of Socrates’ teachings as advice to his friends: “his final wish is: What I have 
always said, ‘take care of yourselves’” (112). While eros was linked to the freedom of the 
other and the perception of mortality, epimeleia obtains in a relation of care with the other 
and transcends individual mortality in a community of collective care. Like eros, epimeleia 
represents a transcendental condition of truth, which unbinds the subject from the self and 
delivers it to a certain immortality and life of the other. 
 The last words of Socrates bring us to the third feeling-practice in Foucault’s journey 
to antiquity, which is courage or parrhēsia, translated literally as “frank speech.” While eros 
related the subject to truth as the truth of one’s being (a being in relation) and epimeleia 
circumscribes truth as a practice between oneself and the other, parrhēsia represents the 
courage to speak the truth for the other in a way that entails the transformation of the subject. 
Foucault’s exemplary figure of parrhēsia is once again Socrates, and his last words are in 
fact his final moment of parrhēsia; for he was executed because of his incessant questioning 
 “We must be ready to receive every moment of discourse in its sudden irruption; in that punctuality in which 73
it appears, and in that temporal dispersion that enables it to be repeated, known, forgotten, transformed, utterly 
erased, and hidden, far from all view, in the dust of books”; see Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 25. 
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of received truths and dogma of Athens. In Foucault’s genealogy of parrhēsia, Socrates 
represents a transition from parrhēsia in the political arena (as in a speech given to a public 
assembly or democratic council) to an ethical parrhēsia that has epimeleia as its goal (CT 
157-158). While political parrhēsia incurred a great risk of persecution or death for the 
speaker in Socrates’ time, ethical or philosophical parrhēsia took a different set of strategies 
and aims. Foucault summarizes the difference between political and ethical parrhēsia: 
“[a]bove all do not engage in politics, for you will die. The aim of the mission is, of course, 
to watch over the others continuously, to care for them as if he were their father or brother. 
But to what end? To encourage them to take care, not of their wealth, reputation, honors, and 
offices, but of themselves, that is to say, of their reason, of truth, and of their soul” (86). In 
addition, Socratic parrhēsia aims to embody and engender the care for life (127-130). In this 
way, parrhēsia is an ethopoetic practice whereby the subject, as either speaker or auditor, is 
transformed as a subject of care. Truth and the courage to speak the truth becomes the 
occasion for the transformation of the subject, even at the risk of ignominy or death.  
 Foucault’s history of ethical parrhēsia draws a direct link between Socrates and the 
later Cynics of the first two centuries CE, for whom parrhēsia comprised the core of their 
philosophical and spiritual practices. Foucault reads the Cynics as radicalizing the Platonist 
doctrine of the true life or aléthés bios by taking it to its most extreme conclusions. 
Specifically, the Cynics radicalize the four key aspects of Plato’s definition of the true life as 
(1) unconcealed or without deception; (2) unalloyed or without mixture of good and evil, 
vice and virtue; (3) straight (euthos) or perfectly in line with the logos or with principles, 
rules, and the nomos; and (4) steadfast, incorruptible, and sovereign (CT 221-225). The 
Cynics interpret the first aspect in the most literal way as a life lived in complete public, 
eating, sleeping, and speaking always in the streets, often clothed with nothing but an old 
cloak (253-254). They radicalize the unconcealed life as a naked life: shameless and brazen 
(255). The Cynics also accept without reservation the most unalloyed, unlimited and 
indefinite poverty, eschewing all and any “pointless wealth” such as even a small dish to 
drink water (258). So too, the true life as the straight life configures nature as the only 
principle and logos to live by, life without convention or prescription (262-263). And finally 
the Cynics understand sovereign self-possession as a life lived solely for the other, offering 
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assistance and encouragement to others, going door to door giving counsel to strangers, 
exercising self-mastery for the sole purpose of providing care (270-272). The true life for the 
Cynic is thus naked, impoverished, bestial, and caring in the most scandalous way possible 
for the ancient world.  
 Contrary to Giorgio Agamben’s famous distinction, found in Aristotle, between the 
true life (bios) of the polis and the excluded life of animality (zoē),  the Cynics dramatize 74
aléthés bios as an absolute embrace of zoē or animality. Parrhēsia as the courage to speak the 
truth becomes for the Cynics the courage to live the true life as an animal life in the service 
of others. In the last few lectures Foucault gave in his life he argues that while Neo-Platonism 
posited the true life as a metaphysics of the other life and the other world—which would later 
become an integral element of Christian metaphysics—the Cynics posited the true life as a 
spiritual practice of an other life that makes possible an other world (CT 246-247). An other 
life is the most true and philosophical life, which serves as the condition of access to an other 
world beyond the present epistemological, political, and ethical configuration of this world. It 
is for this reason that Foucault traces this Cynic radicalization of philosophy through early 
Christian mystic traditions (337), revolutionary “militantism” that posits a revolutionary life 
and a possible new world (183-184), and art movements beginning at the end of the 
eighteenth century that aim to give art and form to an other life.  In Foucault’s hands, 75
parrhēsia becomes a practice with a long history of speaking, thinking, and living otherwise, 
a tradition with which he no doubt would have liked to align himself in his goal of inventing 
a way of doing philosophy and thinking history that opens “the possibility of no longer being, 
doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think.”  If Foucault ever intended to make this link 76
 In light of Foucault’s statement in The Will to Knowledge that “[f]or millennia, man remained what he was for 74
Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence” (WK 143), Agamben reads 
Aristotle’s famous claim in the Politics that while the polis “comes into existence for the sake of life, it exists 
for the good life” (1252b, 30), to argue that Aristotle excludes “the simple fact of living” from the “politically 
qualified life.” See Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998), 2. For a critique of Agamben’s appropriation of Foucault see Jeffrey Nealon, 
Plant Theory: Biopower and Vegetable Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015); and Paul Allen Miller, 
“Against Agamben: Or Living Your Life, Zōē Versus Bios in the Late Foucault,” in Biotheory: Life and Death 
Under Capitalism, ed. by Jeffrey R. Di Leo and Peter Hitchcock (New York: Routledge, 2020), 23-41.  
 Foucault’s examples of “Cynical” figures of modern art and literature range from Baudelaire, Flaubert, and 75
Manet to Francis Bacon, Samuel Beckett, and William Burroughs (CT 187-188).
 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” 46.76
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explicit between his own philosophical aspirations and Cynic parrhēsia, he was cut short by 
his own death. He ends his final lecture with this: “There you are, listen, I had things to say 
to you about the general framework of these analyses. But, well, it is too late. So, thank 
you” (338). 
 In Foucault’s discussion, these three feeling-practices—eros, epimeleia, and 
parrhēsia—have an affective register in the way they involve feelings of pleasure and desire, 
care and responsibility, and courage and imperilment. Moreover, they all share the 
commonality of refusing a separation between truth as an object of knowledge and life as it is 
lived in practice and experience. As Foucault remarks in the first few lectures of The 
Hermeneutics of the Subject (1982), part of his interest in ancient technologies of the self is 
in the way they understand knowledge and truth in its relation to the subject, the costs or 
risks of truth for the subject, and the spiritual practices that make truth possible for the 
subject.  In terms of Foucault’s long genealogy of governmental rationality and its 77
relationship with feeling, which I will take up at length in the next chapter, ancient 
technologies of the self represent a moment where spirituality and rationality, the subject and 
truth, had not yet been separated. For Foucault, “spirituality and philosophy were identical or 
nearly identical in ancient spirituality.”  And yet the Socratic entanglement of gnōthi seauton 78
(self-knowledge) and epimeleia heautou (care of the self) would gradually become untangled 
(HS 68). The “pastoral power” of the Christian church would eventually take up the mantel 
of the power of care (STP 127) in a way that subsumed more explicit questions of truth and 
knowledge, while the “Cartesian moment” in the seventeenth century, concomitant with the 
scientific revolution, would signify a more radical break in the link between spirituality and 
rationality (HS 14). This break between rationality and spirituality will then enable the 
objectification and instrumentalization of feeling as an object of a rational scientia affectus 
without the requirement of a spiritual or artful self-overcoming that belongs to an ars 
 By “spiritual” Foucault does not mean a metaphysical belief in the soul-substance or a spirit world, but the 77
various practices belonging to forms of spirituality ranging from Hellenistic philosophy to Zen Buddhism that 
take up the self as a subject of technē and endeavour to transform or overcome the self: “the subject's attainment 
of a certain mode of being and the transformations that the subject must carry out on itself to attain this mode of 
being” (“The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” 294). In this way, questions of truth 
and the subject are posed as mutually dependent. In Chapter Two I will extend this to Foucault’s discussions of 
“political spirituality.” 
 Ibid.78
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pathetica. More and more over the course of modernity questions of knowledge and truth 
would be posed as separate from questions of the transformation of the subject (17-19). The 
notable exceptions to this de-spiritualization of rationality are, however, Marxism and 
psychoanalysis, for they both pose the question of the link between knowledge and the 
transformation of the subject (29).  This is because the critique of political economy and the 79
theorization of the unconscious have as a necessary correlative the transformation of the 
relations of production on the basis of proletarian knowledge and the transformation of 
psychic economies on the basis of therapeutic examination.    
 Eros, epimeleia, and parrhēsia, then, are forms of ethical ascesis that do not adhere to 
a separation between truth and existence, and it is specifically their affective character that 
allows them to straddle the modern division between life as it is lived and embodied and truth 
as it is a subject of discourse and object of knowledge. In this affective “in between” that 
passes across the subject, experience, truth, and knowledge, there is a rich philosophical and 
spiritual questioning of the truth of being and becoming, of the self and other, and of time 
and death. Eros links the subject with the relation to truth and throws into relief a perception 
of fleeting time, mortality, and the freedom of the other. Epimeleia draws a diagonal between 
medicine and health, philosophy and self-knowledge, and the gods and piety; and it posits 
death as the occasion for care and care as the transcendence of finitude in relation with the 
other. Parrhēsia situates truth as the transformation of the subject in the service of the other, 
the risk and cost of truth for the subject even at the point of dishonour and death, and the 
courage to live otherwise in order to potentiate a new or radical order of existence—“a 
different economy of bodies and pleasures” (WK 159)—beyond the present world. In short, 
these three feeling-practices reveal a deep questioning of the relation between truth and the 
subject, of the essential link between ascesis or self-practice and knowledge, and a certain 
 ”We should not forget that in those forms of knowledge that are not exactly sciences, and which we should 79
not seek to assimilate to the structure of science, there is again the strong and clear presence of at least certain 
elements, certain requirements of spirituality. Obviously, I don't need to draw you a picture: you will have 
immediately identified forms of knowledge like Marxism or psychoanalysis. It goes without saying that it 
would be completely wrong to identify these with religion. This is meaningless and contributes nothing. 
However, if you take each of them, you know that in both Marxism and psychoanalysis, for completely different 
reasons but with relatively homologous effects, the problem of what is at stake in the subject's being (of what 
the subject's being must be for the subject to have access to the truth) and, in return, the question of what 
aspects of the subject may be transformed by virtue of his access to the truth, well, these two questions, which 
are once again absolutely typical of spirituality, are found again at the very heart of, or anyway, at the source 
and outcome of both of these knowledges” (HS, 29).
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use of feeling as a hinge between existence and knowledge, spirituality and rationality. Eros, 
epimeleia, and parrhēsia figure time as fleeting and finite, transcended and dispersed, and, in 
posing different possible orders of time, eschatological. In this way, feeling-practices entail 
the possibility of linking multiple structures, temporalities, and collectivities in a movement 
that, as Foucault puts it in a 1982 article about the photographer Duane Michals, “moves the 
soul and spreads spontaneously from soul to soul.”  In this same article he contemplates the 80
connection between time and what he calls “thought-emotion”: “while time can very well 
bring about its changes, its aging and death, thought-emotion is stronger than time; thought-
emotion alone, can see, and can make seen, time’s invisible wrinkles.”  81
1.3: Feeling, Freedom, Power 
“My role … is to show people that they are much freer than they feel, that people accept as 
truth, as evidence, some themes which have been built up at a certain moment during history, 
and that this so-called evidence can be criticized and destroyed.”  Foucault’s journey 82
through antiquity can be understood, at least in part, as fulfilling this function of showing that 
other ways of relating to the self are possible besides those adopted from either an entrenched 
Christian mode of ethics or a more recent history of scientific knowledge and the scientia 
affectus. The point is to show that the way we relate to ourselves, the way we conceptualize 
the distinction between the intellect and affectivity, is much more open and variable than we 
take it to be. Foucault’s research on Greco-Roman technologies of the self are thus a 
correlative critical endeavour to articulate a new ethics in the present. Rather than grounding 
a theory of the subject on scientific, psychological, and medical discourses inherited from the 
nineteenth century, Foucault argues that antiquity provides a different problematic for 
thinking about the subject and its relation to truth as an aesthetics of existence, which would 
not be constrained to a strict moral code. Of course, there are no solutions to present 
 Michel Foucault, “La Pensée, l’Émotion,” in Dits et Écrits IV 1980-1984, ed. Daniel Defert and François 80
Ewald (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 249.
 Ibid, 250.81
 Michel Foucault, “Truth, Power, Self: An Interview with Michel Foucault,” in Technologies of the Self: A 82
Seminar with Michel Foucault, ed. Luther H. Martin et al. (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 
1988), 10. 
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problems in the solutions to past problems,  but the point is to critique what appears 83
necessary and inevitable: “the object was to learn to what extent the effort to think one’s own 
history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently” (UP 
9). 
 What I have tried to show in this chapter is the degree to which Foucault’s attempt to 
think history in a way that enables a different way of thinking about ourselves in the present 
also involves thinking about feeling in a different way. Feeling-practices make apparent an 
entangled relationship between truth and existence, and in this way, categories of feeling, 
emotion, and affect are not posited as abstract qualities of cognition or physiology, 
effectively sidestepping current debates in the sciences and philosophy of emotion which 
seek to relate emotions either to the mind or to the body.  Rather, Foucault’s history of ethics 84
in antiquity reveals that there are different ways to think about the truth of feeling, that is, as 
lived ethical practices within inter- and intra-subjective relations, and that transcendentally 
conditions truth in the subject’s relations to life, death, time, and the other. The relationality 
and reflexivity of feeling-practices, how they reflect ways of relating to the self and to others, 
serves as the basis for how Foucault understands the condition of freedom. The space and 
distance in the relationship with the self, or modes of reflexivity, the introceptive gravity of 
feeling that leads back to the self, is precisely where Foucault situates freedom. It is a space 
that permits truth to be spoken about the self, a space open to relations of love and care, a 
space for decision, critique, and transformation. This is why for Foucault ethics and freedom 
are necessary corollaries of one another: “freedom is the ontological condition of ethics. But 
ethics is the considered form that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection.”  85
Foucault’s interest in ars pathetica in antiquity shows that the distance obtaining in the 
relation to the self is a space in which feeling circulates, differentiating and dehiscing the 
subject in a way that enables reflexive practices of freedom. In other words, feeling 
 Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” 343.83
 Known also as physicalist versus cognitive theories of emotions. For a broad historical overview of these 84
debates, ranging from universalism to social constructivism, see Jan Plamper’s The History of Emotions: An 
Introduction, trans. Keith Tribe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); as well as Barbara Rosenwein and 
Riccardo Cristiani, What Is The History of Emotions (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017).
 Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” 284.85
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comprises the basic non-identity of the self that is a necessary condition for freedom, ethics, 
and agency. Indeed, if Foucault’s parrhēsia reflects a unity between critique and ethical 
practices of freedom, then critique represents the endeavour to transform the subject, not by 
uncovering a deeper, more authentic, or repressed self, but by transforming the relationship 
with the self, as well as relationships with others and with truth, thereby renewing the 
possibilities for thought.   
 This question of the relation between feeling-practices, ethics, and freedom entails 
also an important political question. For during antiquity the possibility of freedom, ethics, 
and an aesthetics of existence is imbricated in the fact, as I have already mentioned, that the 
Greco-Roman world was a slave society: “insofar as freedom for the Greeks signifies 
nonslavery—which is quite a different definition of freedom from our own—the problem is 
already entirely political. It is political in that nonslavery to others is a condition: a slave has 
no ethics. Freedom is thus inherently political.”  So too, power and domination are both 86
enabling and restricting forces for freedom and ethics. Critiquing power and domination in 
the name of freedom also represents the possibility of the assertion of a new ethics, a new 
relation to truth and the self. Moreover, Foucault sees philosophy, in its “critical aspect,” as 
precisely such an endeavour to call into question power and domination “at every level,” a 
critical attitude that derives from epimeleia just as much as gnosis.  And just as ethical 87
practices of freedom require ways of relating to ourselves as feeling subjects, in eros or 
epimeleia, power and domination also entail ways of addressing the emotional constitutions 
of individuals and the “affective intensities” that run through collectives and institutions.  88
This is where Greco-Roman ethics differs from Christian ethics, specifically in the way 
pastoral power evokes a different conceptualization of care, a different way of relating the 
subject to truth, and a different way of configuring the relation to the self. Care becomes 
 Ibid, 286.86
 Ibid, 300-301.87
 “The institution is caught in a contradiction; affective intensities traverse it which at one and the same time 88
keep it going and shake it up. Look at the army, where love between men is ceaselessly provoked [appete] and 
shamed. Institutional codes can't validate these relations with multiple intensities, variable colors, imperceptible 
movements and changing forms. These relations short-circuit it and introduce love where there's supposed to be 
only law, rule, or habit” (Michel Foucault, “Friendship as a Way of Life,” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. 
Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997), 137.)
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likened to the care of a shepherd over his flock, the subject relates to the truth of the other 
world and the other life, and the relation to the self becomes a suspicious hermeneutics of 
desire. In much of his work on governmentality, Foucault argues that eventually this mode of 
pastoral power will become integrated into the state-form, beginning in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, as a way of governing the conduct of social functions, relations of 
exchange, and disciplinary institutions. This emergence of a governmental rationality unique 
to the State initiates the occlusion of the ars pathetica in favour of the objectification and 
instrumentalization of feeling through a scientia affectus. If the State wishes to govern a 
population through freedom, as liberalism endeavours to do beginning in the eighteenth 
century, and if there is a demand to know the nature of populations, individuals, and social 
formations in order to better govern them, then the problem of knowing, anticipating, and 
even apprehending feelings, emotions, and affects becomes a necessary question. And now, 
neoliberalism’s social austerity and atomistic individual demands its own variant of the care 
of the self, requiring subjects to be emotionally flexible, able to transform themselves and 
adapt to any number of situations and work environments. 
 These political problems of categories of feeling in Foucualt’s middle period are 
taken up in the next chapter, in which I move from a discussion of feeling-practices as forms 
of ascesis or work upon the self to feeling-substances or ways of disciplining and controlling 
the self. In this historical shift from feeling-practices to feeling-substances my intention is to 
track in Foucault’s work neither the lines of a transformation of the nature of feelings nor the 
simple mutations of power relations in the ways they discipline, control, or harness the 
subject’s emotional constitution. Instead, I argue that the historical passage from feeling-
practices to feeling-substances, from an ars pathetica to a scientia affectus, relates more 
precisely to a transformation in the way humans relate to themselves, as subjects of ethical 
action and reflection, as agents able to speak a certain truth about themselves, as subjects of 
relations of power and government, and as objects of knowledge and science. While my 
focus will narrow to the specific problematic of Foucault’s genealogies of discipline, 
biopower, and governmentality, my aim is to show how power has compelled modes of 
reflexivity that position affectivity as something to be managed, in one way or another, in a 
position of subordination to the intellect, or liberated in a way that shores up more dynamic 
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forms of control and normalization. How do relations of power or forms of domination 
enable the conditions of emergence for possible ways of relating to the self? How do 
categories of feeling figure into the historical fluctuations of what Foucault calls the conduct 
of conduct?  What will emerge in the subsequent discussion is a political theory of feeling as 89
a primary object of attempts to manage or conduct the behaviour of subjects, but also as one 
of the principal means of resistance that the subject has for refusing power. If this chapter has 
shown the ways in which feeling-practices affect a sort of “curiosity” in the subject that 
“enables one to get free of oneself” (UP 8), then the discussion of feeling-substances in the 
next chapter aims to identify categories of feeling as conditioning the possibility for both 
power and refusal, government and resistance. 
 For Foucault’s original discussion of the conduct of conduct, see the Security, Territory, Population lecture 89
from 1 March, 1978. While I am stressing the double order of conducting the conduct of individuals, in 
Foucault’s discussion there is actually a triple order: the conducting of the (self-)conduction of individuals’ 
conduct, which gives rise to a cascade of historical “counter-conducts,” the lines of which Foucault identifies, 
for example, in various heresies that precipitated the Reformation.
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Chapter Two: Power and the Government of Feeling 
And when the time for the breaking  
of the law is here, be sure it is to take place in the matrix  
of our everyday thoughts and fantasies, our wonderment 
at how we got from there to here. In the unlashed eye of noon 
these and other terrible things are written, yet it seems  
at the time as mild as soughing of wavelets in a reservoir. 
    — John Ashbery  90
2.1: Affect, Power, Refusal 
In turning to Foucault’s work on relations of power and governmentality, this discussion of 
the relation between feeling and power drifts into familiar territory for affect studies, for 
which the connection between affect, power, and politics has long been a central question.  91
And yet Foucault’s critics often consider him an incisive and influential thinker of power 
who unfortunately neglected to reflect explicitly on affect. One of the more prominent 
critiques comes from Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s classic 1997 essay “Paranoid Reading and 
Reparative Reading” and the introduction to her 2002 book, Touching Feeling. Sedgwick, 
while strongly influenced by Foucault and the first volume of the History of Sexuality, The 
Will to Knowledge [La volonté de savior] notes the tension in Foucault’s (or Foucauldian 
 John Ashbery, Flow Chart (New York: Open Road, 2014), 15. 90
 The editors of The Affect Theory Reader named theorizations of the relations between power and affect as one 91
of the major streams of affect theory; see Gregory J. Seigworth and Melissa Gregg, “An Inventory of 
Shimmers,” in The Affect Theory Reader, 7.
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scholars’) attempts to move away from the repressive hypothesis while refuelling a more 
“abstract” version of the repressive hypothesis that pits hegemony against subversion.  The 92
problem for Sedgwick is how Foucault’s critique of the repressive hypothesis fails to open up 
the space for a more complex account of freedom and the creative ability of the subject to 
find motivation and satisfaction in a complex and sometimes hostile environment. The 
“analysis of the pseudodichotomy between repression and liberation has led, in many cases, 
to its conceptual reimposition in the even more abstractly reified form of the hegemonic and 
the subversive,”  in which the freedom of the subject becomes once again pitted between 93
two opposing forces wherein the more nuanced creativity of freedom is occluded. To counter 
this dichotomy between hegemony and subversion, Sedgwick argues that the affect theory of 
Silvan Tomkins accounts for what she calls the “middle ranges of agency” that are for her 
missing in Foucault’s work.  Sedgwick’s concept of the “middle ranges of agency” denotes 94
the ranges of agency between pure acceptance or refusal within a limiting and/or enabling 
situation, relating less to what decisions the subject makes (or even their ability to make 
them) then how they author themselves as ethical actors of even the most limited decisions. 
This conception of the more grey-areas of agency is heavily influenced by Tomkins’ 
discussion of the freedom of the affect system as a freedom relative to one’s ability to 
understand and satisfy one’s own wishes or aims within a complex and changing 
environment; “a human being thus becomes freer as his wants grow and as his capacities to 
satisfy them grow.”  Freedom, then, is neither an absolute, nor merely a question of external 95
(i.e., political) limitations. Rather, enhancing freedom involves creatively learning how to 
develop and satisfy one’s wants even in an environment that is hostile to the satisfaction of 
those wants, such as a violently homophobic social environment or a politically oppressive 
regime. The dichotomy of repression and liberation, however, which Foucault criticizes, fails 
 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham: Duke University 92
Press, 2003), 12.
 Ibid.93
 Ibid, 12-13.94
 Silvan Tomkins, Shame and Its Sisters, 36.95
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to account for the more nuanced processes involved in learning how one feels and what one 
wants and consequently developing forms of nourishment and satisfaction.   
 Before tackling Sedgwick’s critique, it is worth briefly reviewing Foucault’s original 
critique of the repressive hypothesis which, by running against the conventional story of 
sexual moralities from pagan antiquity through Christianity and into modernity, opens up a 
novel account of power. Foucault’s analysis strays away from instances of power that 
function through the law, such as prohibition, and moves to less visible (and so potentially 
more effective) instances of the way power produces or incites, rather than represses, sexual 
practices, standards of thought, feelings, speech, behaviour, and modes of subjectivity. 
Foucault’s critique is not exactly targeted at a psychoanalytic theory of repression so much as 
a Freudo-Marxian theory of power that gained a large degree of influence and popularity in 
France during the 1960s and 70s and that had its peak in discussions around the “sexual 
revolution” occurring at the time. Rather than seeing sexuality as an immutable reservoir of 
human subjectivity that required liberation in the face of repressive forces of desire in the 
family, in schools and churches, and civil society more generally, Foucault was interested in 
how sexuality had become a historically contingent way of relating to ourselves, of turning 
the feelings, pleasures, and desires related to sex into so much talk, transforming sex into an 
object of discourse. Since the sixteenth century, Foucault argues that “the ‘putting into 
discourse of sex,’ far from undergoing a process of restriction, on the contrary has been 
subjected to a mechanism of increasing incitement; … the techniques of power exercised 
over sex have not obeyed a principle of rigorous selection, but rather one of dissemination 
and implantation of polymorphous sexualities” (WK 12). In other words, what can be 
observed between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries around the emergence of the concept 
of sexuality is not a liberation of sex following its restriction, but a growing investment in 
sex as an object of knowledge, as the secret locus of the truth of the subject, and as a science 
of sex and the sexed individual or “scientia sexualis.” 
 Through this intervention in the received wisdom of sexuality and repression 
Foucault advances his concept of biopower. He had previously spoken about biopower in his 
lectures at the Collège de France in 1976 in relation to how the concept of human life and the 
population became an object of governance for modern States beginning in the eighteenth 
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and nineteenth centuries. In contrast to the way power had become figured as repressive, the 
theory of biopower aims to understand how the standardization of life and the normalization 
of thought, feeling, and behaviour is achieved through power’s Yes more than its No. 
Foucault makes a number of propositions that were meant to amend a more commonplace 
idea of how power functioned at the time: (1) power is not a substance or anything that can 
be simply “acquire, seized, or shared,” but is “exercised from innumerable points” within 
society and discourse; (2) power is not external to types of relations belonging to economy, 
knowledge, or sex, and does not maintain the role of prohibition but is directly productive in 
heterogenous forms of relations; (3) “power comes from below” in a diffuse manner of wide-
ranging social forces, from economic production, familial relations, and institutions, capable 
of being redistributed or homogenized to serve aims of domination; (4) “power is intentional 
yet nonsubjective,” with any number of intelligible aims, objectives, and functions but which 
are not reducible to individual consciousness, choices, or decisions on the part of members of 
the ruling class or State; and (5) “where there is power, there is resistance,” insofar as 
resistance is not external to power but forms part of its internal logic, with power and 
resistance constantly attempting to outmaneuver each other, adapting to one another in a vast 
network of power relations, initiating the dance and drama of subjectivation (WK 94-95). 
Biopower then comes to represent an ensemble of forces that endeavour to produce, manage, 
and maintain life, whether through discourses on sexuality, economic policies that advance 
means of population management, or more overtly violent forms of State racism that 
privilege the protection of certain lives at the expense of others.   
 Sedgwick argues that scholars’ receptions of the first volume of the History of 
Sexuality, whether through a misreading of Foucault’s text or through accurate reproductions 
of a tension already present in the text, tend to reinscribe the repressive hypothesis rather 
than do away with it. Either way, the “implicit promise” of The Will to Knowledge—“that 
there might be ways of stepping outside the repressive hypothesis” —is left unfulfilled, both 96
by Foucault himself and his readers. Because the common take away is not only that power 
as prohibition is a modern ruse of biopower but that some form of prohibition is still at work 
in a more diffuse manner, such interpretations tend to reify a more abstract dichotomy 
 Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 10.96
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between hegemony and subversion. In Gramscian fashion, hegemony would then represent 
the functioning of power at a deeper level, calling for more intimate forms of subversion and 
individual resistance that would contradict the whole of the total order of power. Sedgwick’s 
issue here is with identifying power qua hegemony with the status quo. The consequence, as 
she writes, is that “one’s relation to what is risks becoming reactive and bifurcated, that of a 
consumer: one’s choices narrow to accepting or refusing (buying, not buying) this or that 
manifestation of it, dramatizing only the extremes of compulsion and voluntarity. Yet it is 
only the middle ranges of agency that offer space for effectual creativity and change.”  The 97
Foucauldian image of power’s productive Yes would then merely conceal a belief in a deeper 
prohibitive No that extends across the totality of what is, occluding those “middle ranges of 
agency” that Sedgwick finds so important. The critique of the repressive hypothesis would 
thus represent a vain attempt to disavow the centrality of repression: a failure to observe the 
nuances of the father’s No. What emerges would then be a sort of Foucauldian version of 
Herbert Marcuse’s “repressive desublimation”: an account of how apparent experiences of 
liberation and freedom, such as acceptable expressions of sexuality in work environments, 
function as covert forms of repression on another, deeper level of the production and 
reproduction of the social apparatus.   98
 One of the strengths of Sedgwick’s analysis, however, is her suspicion that there is 
more to Foucault’s critique of the repressive hypothesis, even if she is more critical of the 
ambiguities, tensions, and unfulfilled promises of his critique. For the general momentum of 
Foucault’s critique is not that the father’s Yes is also a No, but that relations of power extend 
beyond the dualistic distinctions between the ruler and the ruled, Yes and No, or freedom and 
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domination. And what Foucault actually says is irreducible to the bifurcation of agency 
Sedgwick finds in the scholarly reception of Foucault’s critique. Alluding to Marcuse’s 
“Great Refusal,”  Foucault writes:  99
There is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or 
pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a 
special case: resistances that are possible, necessary, improbable; others that are 
spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent; still others that are 
quick to compromise, interested, or sacrificial; by definition, they can only exist in 
the strategic field of power relations. (WK 95-96) 
Because there is no single, monolithic totality of power, there is also no single site of 
resistance or refusal. If power is diffuse, then so is resistance. Even as a multiplicity of forces 
homogenize and form ensembles of sites of domination, there are still only multiple points of 
resistance, requiring different strategies, intensities, and objectives. This also means 
resistance can never be total; its efficacy is not in its contradiction with a totality of forces but 
in its specific insertion in a field of forces.  
 In a 1977 interview with the editors of the journal, Les révoltes logiques, Foucault 
distinguishes this plurality of resistances from reformism. While reformism is a political 
practice that tends to be non-critical of more entrenched forms of power, Foucault rebukes a 
common left-wing critique of local resistances “on the grounds that they may gave rise to 
reform.”  According to this familiar argument, local resistance can never rise to the 100
challenge of having a wider effect on more global systems of power because it will always be 
assimilated, recuperated, or ignored to the point of non-relevance; even if it does have a 
notable local effect it will only alert power to possible points of tension or transformation. 
Foucault’s problem with this line of thinking is that it subordinates political struggle to the 
“meagre logic of contradiction”: “the problem is precisely as to whether the logic of 
contradiction can actually serve as a principle of intelligibility and rule of action in political 
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struggle.”  Moreover, whereas this logic of contradiction served as a historically contingent 101
point of resistance in the nineteenth century as a refusal of the bourgeois idea of the social 
contract,  now it has the effect of paralyzing political and ethical agency. For political 102
struggle is not a zero-sum game, agency is not bifurcated between acceptance and refusal, as 
in Sedgwick’s consumer. On the contrary, there is a plurality of refusals—even at the “middle 
ranges of agency”—according to different exertions and formations of power.   
 While Sedgwick turns to the work of Tomkins to supplement an account of these 
“middle ranges of agency,” my argument is that there is already something akin to this more 
nuanced account of freedom in Foucault’s thinking. And just as Sedgwick finds an 
understanding of complex agency in Tomkins’ affect theory, I think that it is precisely the 
affective dimension of Foucault’s thinking that allows him to reach similar theoretical 
conclusions. The problem is twofold: (1) despite how Foucault has often been read, he does 
offer an account, in the History of Sexuality and elsewhere, of the complex or “middle” 
ranges of agency and freedom and an avoidance of the bifurcation of freedom into 
acceptance of hegemony and refusal in subversion; and (2) there are a number of 
incompatibilities and difficulties that arise between Foucault and Tomkins, specifically in the 
way Tomkins and Foucault think about the relation between freedom and affect and feeling. 
While Tomkins’ work is certainly edifying in its own right, the aforementioned problems 
make Sedgwick’s use of Tomkins to mount a critique of Foucault problematic. 
 According to Tomkins, the freedom of the affect system is first a question of degree, 
of degrees of freedom and constraint; second of all, this freedom of degree is constituted by 
the capacity of the affect system to combine with cognition in a feedback loop, allowing the 
affect system to take a variety of objects; and third, this autonomy of affect comprises a 
motivational system for subjective agency.  Apart from Tomkins’ systems theory language, 103
there is a similar “feedback loop” in the way Foucault understands the relation to the self. 
However, there is no clean separation between cognition and affect, between thought and the 
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body, or between reason and unreason, that is external to power, discourse, or history. 
Second, while Tomkins distinguishes complex emotions from the eight or nine basic affects 
that comprise the complexity of emotion,  such a discursive construction would always be 104
open to a Foucauldian archaeological analysis, which would aim to understand the historical 
conditions of possibility that permit a meaningful distinction of affect and emotion on the 
basis of a systems theory metaphor. A number of questions thus arise from a confrontation 
between Foucault and Tomkins, making them hard to reconcile. How is it that feeling has 
become a particular object of knowledge in this way, reduced to less than a dozen universal 
core affects? What historical conditions of emergence have been at play in making the body 
visible as a machinic system of feedback loops and general assemblies? What relation would 
this machinic assemblage of systems of affect, drive, and cognition have to the way 
developments in disciplinary power in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries achieved a 
mechanization of the human body as docile cogs and vectors of labour and production?  105
Even more, what are the ethical consequences for this particular way of relating to the self? 
 These questions lead back to a central inquiry into how feeling and power relate to 
one another, and how relations of power beginning in the seventeenth century have enabled 
the discursive production of the categories of feeling, emotion, and affect. While this 
question of power and feeling is similar to concerns raised by Deleuzian affect theorist 
Massumi, albeit without an explicit historical dimension, it is a question whose genealogical 
register has not yet been well-explored in affect studies. While Massumi’s work has often 
minimized the role of history in modulating and shaping the circulations of affect,  my 106
discussion of the genealogical relation between feeling and power dovetails with Sedgwick’s 
account of the sometimes blurry distinction between paranoid readings and reparative 
readings. Allow me to explain. Sedgwick appropriates the vocabulary of psychoanalyst 
Melanie Klein’s paranoid and depressive positions, denoting opposite positions or relations 
with an object; the paranoid ego fixates on an external “bad” part-object anxiously and 
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suspects malevolent intent, while the depressive position works toward repairing the 
wholeness of the object as neither purely good nor bad.  Sedgwick argues that paranoia had 107
become the default position of critical theory due to the influence of what Paul Ricoeur 
called the “masters of suspicion”: Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud.  Paranoid readings 108
(dominant in New Historicist, Marxist, deconstructionist, feminist, queer, and psychoanalytic 
criticism) tend to privilege demystification and the stony-eyed dissolution of meaning around 
motifs such as false consciousness, the will to power, or the unconscious. Reparative 
readings, on the contrary, represent the critical endeavour to restore meaning, to repair one’s 
relation to the object of criticism. And while Sedgwick argues that paranoia has become the 
dominant mode of criticism for the many leftist academics and intellectuals, reparation and 
paranoia are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Mentioning a number of writers and artists, 
including Ronald Firbank, Djuna Barnes, and Joseph Cornell, she remarks that “sometimes 
[it is] the most paranoid-tending people who are able to, and need to, develop and 
disseminate the richest reparative practices.”  To this theme of the creative and critical 109
symbiosis of paranoia and reparation, Sedgwick is able to write that Foucauldian genealogy 
represents a paranoid way of reading history that is not separable from reparative practices of 
love.  Accordingly, the ethical possibilities of reparation move in the direction of Foucault’s 110
care of the self: “the often very fragile concern to provide the self with pleasure and 
nourishment in an environment that is perceived as not particularly offering them.”    111
 Yet, reparative readings often require some level of paranoia in order to avoid giving 
uncritical assent to an ensemble of relations of power. This is why Foucault characterizes 
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love as a radically fluid form of power, which is enabled by ethical practices of care and 
persistent contestations of frozen relations of power. In relations of love, passion, and 
pleasure, there is a fluid reversibility of power “where one wields power over the other in an 
open-ended strategic game.”  In love, I exert power over the other just as much as I am 112
overcome by the power of the other. Power here is influence, or as Deleuze writes in 
Foucault (1986), it is the power “to affect or to be affected.”  Affection, care, and the 113
fluidity of pleasure represent power’s true indifference to subject and object, a sublation of 
wielding power and being overpowered. Such power inherent in love represents both a 
paranoid skepticism of power in all its forms and a care and affection toward repairing one’s 
relationship with oneself and with others. Power is always contestable, conferring an agency 
of pleasure and affection on the subject which makes possible ethical practices of love, not an 
empty and general love for all, but a local and contingent love engaged in passion, pleasure, 
care, and affection for and with oneself and others. Unfortunately, this account of power as 
affection is no simple solution. All we need is not simply love. For it is in a society where 
relationships between groups and individuals permit more freedom and agency, and so more 
ethical possibilities of love, care, and affection, that governmentality becomes more and more 
crucial as a way of managing the conduct and behaviour of individuals. Importantly, Foucault 
understands governmentality, specifically in modern capitalist societies, as intervening in 
relations of affect, whether sexual, familial, or otherwise.  If relations of power permit more 114
levels of freedom, and more ethical possibilities of affection, of love, care, or courage, then 
government responds precisely to intervene at the level of affect.  
 In the remainder of the chapter I will try to advance a textual reconstruction of 
Foucault’s genealogy of governmentality from the view of this government of feeling. Far 
from entailing a strictly paranoid view of affective practices fully within the capture of 
power, Foucault’s genealogy encourages both paranoid and reparative readings of history. 
My intention is to show how the government of feeling, while reflecting all the dangers 
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inherent in relations of power, also entails creative possibilities for affective resistance and 
refusal, entailing new reparative ways of relating to the self and novel ethical and political 
possibilities for the subject. The strength of Foucault’s thinking on power allows the analysis 
to shift from the descriptions of power to possible forces of flight, points of weakness and 
contention, openings for refusal and resistance. And so the modern age has witnessed 
power’s objectification of feelings in tandem with a scientia affectus, with the discursive 
formation of feeling-substances as an epistemological flag post. Meanwhile, widespread 
attempts to apprehend or appeal to the emotional and affective constitutions of individuals, 
and endeavours to govern and standardize emotions and behaviours, results not in the 
nullification of feeling but the intensification of feeling as a domain of struggle. In other 
words, alongside the strategies, tactics, and micro-physics involved in the government of 
feeling, there is also a series of sites for a plurality of refusals. 
2.2: On the Government of Feeling 
Foucault’s genealogy of governmentality begins in two places. First, as Foucault outlines in 
the 1978 lectures at the Collège de France, Security, Territory, Population, the emergence of 
governmentality as a raison d’État ranges between the middle of the sixteenth century 
through the eighteenth century, when the State begins to take on the role of the art of 
government. What occurs during this time, through political reflections on liberal economic 
policy and the burgeoning field and utilization of statistics, is that the State becomes 
concerned with domains of social life that had traditionally not belonged to relations of 
sovereignty: “to improve the condition of the population, to increase its wealth, its longevity, 
and its health” (STP 105). While the sovereign State had traditionally been interested in 
maintaining, protecting, or expanding a territory or principality in a relationship of 
singularity, externality, and transcendence to its subjects (a position defended most famously 
by Niccolo Machiavelli in The Prince (STP 91)), the art of government attests to a more 
direct relationship with the population, with the capacities of social and civil institutions, and 
with the maintenance of health. During this time, the meaning of the word economy begins to 
shift from defining the appropriate “government” of the family and the household (a meaning 
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derived from the Greek word, oikonomia) to the more political domain of the government of 
“things”: the circulation of goods; the relations of wealth, resources, and property; and the 
relationships between men and “things” like “customs, habits, ways of acting and 
thinking” (STP 96). This is the more idiosyncratic designation of economy proposed by 
Guillaume de La Perrière (c. 1499-1565) in a treatise from 1555 (92). But what had been a 
more idiosyncratic definition of economic government in the sixteenth century then slowly 
begins to influence State policy, most notably in the eighteenth century by the physiocrats, 
like François Quesnay (1694-1774) and Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot  
(1727-1781), and later by economists like Adam Smith (1723-1790). Similarly, government 
begins to circumscribe the State’s endeavour to know and direct a population, its individuals, 
its institutions; the circulations of things, goods, and wealth; and markers of health such as 
birth and death rates.  
 The second origin of Foucault’s genealogy of governmentality begins in the 
prehistory of the State’s seizure of government from a domain that had previously belonged 
to the family and to religion, and before that in Greco-Roman reflections on spiritual 
kubernou, or counsel, direction, and guidance. In the 1978 lectures, Foucault delves into this 
government of souls by way of the theme of the Christian pastorate or pastoral power, a form 
of power that aims to care for and guide a group of individuals in the way that a shepherd 
cares for a flock of sheep. Originating in the West via Hebraic culture and religion, but also 
present in Egyptian, Assyrian, and Mesopotamian literatures (STP 123), pastoral power is 
exercised not on a territory but on a multiplicity of individuals. Its aim is to benefit (morally, 
politically, and spiritually) the flock by providing subsistence and salvation, which represents 
an individualizing power that cares for the individual insofar as they are part of the 
multiplicity (125-129). These components would become relevant for modern techniques of 
population management that Foucault identifies in liberal economic policy, police and law 
enforcement, statistics, and biopolitical intervention in the health of the population. While the 
pastorate and its ideal of the king-shepherd and the god-shepherd was not widely accepted in 
Greco-Roman thought before Christianity introduced it to the West, Foucault argues that it 
circumscribes a set of relations of power that have come to define the subjectivity of 
“Western man,” his relation to himself, to others, and to truth. Speaking on the “paradoxical” 
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power of the pastorate and its role in the development of Christendom and the history of 
Western civilization and subjectivity, Foucault makes clear the stakes in this form of 
government: 
Of all civilization, the Christian West has undoubtedly been, at the same time, the 
most creative, the most conquering, the most arrogant, and doubtless the most bloody. 
At any rate, it has certainly been one of the civilizations that has deployed the greatest 
violence. But, at the same time, and this is the paradox I would like to stress, over 
millennia Western man has learned to see himself as a sheep in a flock, something 
that assuredly no Greek would have been prepared to accept. Over millennia he has 
learned to ask for his salvation from a shepherd who sacrifices himself for him. (130) 
Despite Foucault’s insistence on the importance of the pastorate for the development of 
governmentality and Western subjectivity, when he returns to these questions two years later 
in his 1980 Paris lectures, On the Government of the Living, he argues that the pastorate is 
important but not isomorphic with early Christian techniques of spiritual direction or the 
government of souls (GL 255). Instead, Christian spiritual direction develops from a number 
of forms of ascesis from Classical Greece and Imperial Rome, ranging from Plantonism to 
Stoicism, but emends and diverges from Greco-Roman spirituality as well, from the 
elaboration of metanoia as an essential break with the self, to reflections on the proper form 
and nature of penance, baptism, and, a bit later beginning in the fourth century, confession. 
The institutionalization of confession by the seventh and eighth centuries would come to 
represent for Foucault a major turning point in ancient spirituality and ethics and a watershed 
moment in the history of the Western subject. On the one hand, confession appears to extend 
the Pythian principle of gnothi seauton or self-knowledge, but on the other hand, it would 
irrevocably alter the subject’s relation to the truth as a truth that is hidden deep within the self 
and that requires putting that truth into speech in order to know it and to distinguish true from 
false. This interest in the institutionalization of confession would link up with a central 
question that Foucault addresses in The Will to Knowledge regarding the way in which the 
modern construction of the relation between subjectivity and sexuality has entailed various 
ways of putting sex into discourse. In addition, the theme of confession picks up a number of 
questions that pervade his work on madness, confinement, and psychiatry in the History of 
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Madness, in which confession plays a key role in diagnosis and treatment (as it still does in 
today’s therapeutic interventions). Similarly, confession is also related to a whole ensemble 
of penal, disciplinary, and juridical techniques that permeate the criminal-punishment system 
from law enforcement to modern prisons and the construction of the discursive object of 
criminal subjectivity. The central question Foucault then asks, in relation to the extreme ends 
of violence and creativity that Christian civilization has embodied, is why has confession 
become this fundamental bedrock not just of spirituality but also of psychology and justice? 
Why has “Western man” persisted in identifying and manifesting the truth of himself by 
speaking it? And why has this confessional subjectivity become an essential object of 
government? 
 Like most of Foucault’s more pressing questions, there are no clear answers to this 
question, only a series of efforts to limn the contours of the confessional subject, to find 
points of contest and weakness, openings for new questions. In terms of the government of 
feeling, this institutionalization of confession utilizes two key affective registers: fear and 
shame. If Christianity introduces a novel form of the relation to the self in the Greco-Roman 
world, it is metus or the fear of the self that enables this shift in subjectivity: 
Fear, for the first time in history—well, fear in the sense of fear about oneself, of 
what one is, of [what may happen], and not fear of destiny, not fear of the gods’ 
decrees—this fear is, I think, anchored in Christianity from the turn of the second and 
third century and will obviously be of absolutely decisive importance in the whole 
history of what we may call subjectivity, that is to say the relationship of self to self, 
the exercise of self on self, and the truth that the individual may discover deep within 
himself (GL 127-128). 
This metus or anxiety is predicated on the fear of the other that is within oneself, Satan, or the 
evil spirit that resides alongside the soul. In its very early stages, Christianity wrestles with 
competing notions of a divine or pure element of the soul, inherited from Platonic and Stoic 
traditions and advanced by the Gnostics, a soul that would be at odds with the world of 
falsity, shadow, and ignorance. Instead, the early Christians figure a soul that is constantly at 
battle with the evil within itself, and that alone the soul does not have the resources or the 
reason to differentiate good from bad, truth from falsity.  
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 Early on, in the first three centuries during and following the Apostolic period, the 
consequences of the fear of the self lead to articulations of baptism and the “discipline of 
repentance” or penance (paenitentia, the Latin translation of the Greek word metanoia) (GL 
128). Because the self is an object of fear, then what is needed is the transformation or 
conversion of the self. If the presence of the other within oneself (Satan) is the source and 
origin of sin, then baptism and penance aim to correct this relation between the other and sin 
by linking death with the relationship to the self. Discussing the works of Tertullian (c. 155-c. 
225) and Origen of Alexandria (c. 185-c. 253), Foucault observes that the early Church 
Fathers understood baptism as a preparation for death and a mortification of the self (156). In 
preparing for death, baptism was supposed to signify a crossing of thresholds, a struggle with 
the other and its expulsion from oneself, whereby death represents the truth of life (157). 
Penance, both the accompaniment to baptism and its renewal, then, conveys the impossibility 
of the perfection of the soul, the tendency to relapse or to relive the original fall, and the need 
to find salvation despite and even in imperfection. Early penance, however, before the 
institutionalization of confession, took somewhat different, sometimes conflicting, forms. 
One of these is exomologesis, which while it is often translated as confession, played a 
different role in the early stages of the Christianity. Exomologesis was the manifestation of 
the self and the manifestation of one’s sins, but generally in a more or less non-verbal 
function (212): a public dramaturgy and display of oneself as a sinner, accompanied by 
fasting, prayers, vigils, and supplications, as well as “the rites of ashes, entreaties, the hair, 
shirt, cries, tears, kneeling” (212-213). It thus functions as a manifestation of the self, not in 
the sins one has committed, but as the sinner that one is. In showing oneself to be a sinner, 
the penitent identifies herself as belonging to the world of death and flesh, to be, as Foucault 
puts it, “dying to death”; and in this identification of oneself with death the penitent looks 
toward rebirth through death (213): “it is a matter of manifesting what one is and, at the same 
time, erasing what one is” (213-214).  
 The fear of the other within oneself, and consequently the identification with death 
and the renunciation of the self, comprise the basis of early Christian technologies of the self. 
And while the common view of Foucault’s later work sees him as advocating a more Greek 
sensibility of an aestheticization of existence through an ethics of pleasure, his own 
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comments on desubjectification and the refusal to be what one is echo more exactly these 
early Christian forms of ascesis, metanoia, and the mortification of self, prior to the 
institutionalization of confession. Echoing the Christian metanoic break with the self and 
ego, he writes in 1982: “Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are but to 
refuse what we are.”  Foucault’s partial ambivalence toward the Church Fathers is thus not 115
due to the fear and metanoic renunciation of the self but with the introduction of the 
mechanism of shame. Fear of the self had already instilled an ethic of obedience to, 
effectively, anyone but the self. Because the self can always be deceived it is necessary to 
obey in everything, even the most absurd orders, a common feature of early monastic 
communities.  But it is the mechanism of shame that marries obedience to a power relation 116
of speaking the truth. In opposition to effectively non-verbal forms of exomologesis, the 
institutionalization of confession is precipitated by the binding of the manifestation of self 
(which had characterized confession) and the explicit verbalization of sin. Rather than 
examining one’s actions, and manifesting oneself as a sinner, confession beginning in 
monastic communities in the fourth and fifth centuries becomes wedded to a deep 
exploration, divulgence, and interiorization of the self through speech, exemplified by the 
early proponent of monasticism, John Cassian (CE 360-436). In order to know if one’s 
thoughts are good or bad, to know what parts of the self have their source in evil and which 
are rooted in good, one must speak. The good things, as Cassian’s argument goes, will have 
no difficulty or resistance being spoken. But the evil things will be accompanied by shame 
(GL 305). This mechanism of shame will serve as a tool for recognizing the truth of oneself 
and differentiating it from falsity, an essential element in the form of confession that is to 
replace exomologesis and link up with a whole ensemble of sciences of the individual in the 
modern age: exagoreusis, or “the perpetual putting oneself into discourse” (307). But while 
shame for Tomkins or Sedgwick is caught in the energetics of affect, as the partial inhibition 
 Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 785. Importantly, however, it is not exactly the fear of the self and the 115
evil within it that conveys the metanoic break with the self that Foucault is interested in, but the aesthetics of 
pleasure: “The intensities of pleasure are indeed linked to the fact that you desubjugate yourself, that you cease 
being a subject, an identity. It is like an affirmation of nonidentity”; see Foucault, “The Gay Science,” trans. 
Nicholae Morar and Daniel W. Smith, Critical Inquiry 37.2 (2011), 400.
 In stories of obedience through absurdity related in the Lausiac History in the fifth century, a monk is 116
ordered to water a stick every day, another to throw his eight year old son in a river (GL 269-270).
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of positive affect,  and the positive objectivity of consciousness and subjective interiority,  117 118
the Christian coupling of shame and metus precedes and precludes the possibility of a 
positive self as object of knowledge that the Tomkins model—as well as the scientia affectus
—assumes.  
 For it will take over a millennium before sex, feeling, and subjectivity would be put 
into a scientific discourse in the form of Foucault’s “scientia sexualis” and with what I am 
calling a scientia affectus. What was first needed, however, for the emergence of a scientia 
affectus was the elaboration of a positivity of the subject and an ontological foundation of the 
self, which early Christianity had warded off through the fear of the self. For the positive 
cohesion of Christian subjectivity is always threatened by the presence of the other within the 
self, either in the form of Satan or the Holy Spirit. One of the openings or weaknesses in the 
construction of the confessional subject and the scientia affectus that Foucault’s discussion of 
the Church Fathers reveals is in the negativity of the self to which early Christianity attests. 
In effect, this absence of an ontological foundation of the subject would remain an obstacle 
for any science of the individual until the seventeenth century. Foucault scholar James 
Bernauer S.J. describes this distinction between positive and negative subjectivity as such:  
For the Christian, the truths of the self were always precarious, for they always 
related to the soul’s continual conflict with the evil within itself. There could be no 
firm allegiance to a positive self, for there was no truth about the self that could not 
be utilized by the False One as a device for misleading and ensnaring the soul… The 
aim of modern knowledge and technologies of the self, however, is to foster the 
emergence of the positive self; one recognizes and attaches oneself to the self made 
 Tomkins, Shame and Its Sisters, 134.117
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available through the categories of psychological and psychoanalytic science, and 
through the normative disciplines consistent with them.  119
But Foucault places this modern elaboration of positive subjectivity in a way that is in 
agreement with the development of Christianity rather than against it. Just as Foucault 
identifies the “Cartesian moment” as the definitive break between spirituality and rationality 
in the classical episteme, he discusses Descartes’s role in formulating an ontological 
positivity that is fully consistent with Christianity’s confessional interiorization of the self. As 
Foucault points out, Descartes’s malicious demon reflects the traditional role of Satan in 
deceiving the self and triggering a sweeping doubt of the self. But rather than this 
precipitating the plumbing of one’s deepest interiority and the infinite skepticism of the soul, 
Descartes finds the one solid bedrock of subjectivity in the simple fact of one’s existence. 
Satan may deceive you in all your thoughts, perceptions, and feelings, but he cannot trick you 
into thinking you do not exist. Despite this new foundation of self-knowledge, the essential 
structure of confession, of deep self-suspicion and self-examination, remains intact, 
especially the forms of obedience that it engenders. Since you can still always be deceived, 
obedience to God and to anyone but oneself is still necessary to prevent one’s will from 
deceiving itself. But with Descartes, knowledge of the individual is now possible, beginning 
with the ontological fact of one’s existence as a thinking subject. Obedience is no longer a 
social recourse due to the impossibility of self-knowledge, but now it is the accompaniment 
of knowledge. Eventually, this knowledge of the individual will enable the emergence of a 
scientia affectus and the formation of feeling-substances and their disciplinary optimization; 
correlatively, the relation to the self and to one’s feelings becomes suffused with relations of 
obedience. 
 This shift in the function of obedience and its relationship to knowledge echoes a set 
of concerns that Foucault raises in Discipline and Punish (1975). How did confession 
become a technique of discipline and an object of power in the modern age? How did 
obedience change from its existence in monastic communities in the first millennium to the 
forms of obedience required in a prison or factory in the nineteenth century? Even more, if 
the emergence of governmentality in the eighteenth century entailed a shift from a negative 
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sovereign power to a more productive and positive administrative power, then how did this 
modify already existing mechanisms of discipline, of which confession played a key role? 
Foucault broaches this question in Discipline and Punish, a question that would arguably 
absorb him for the rest of his life. If discipline had come to be a principal technology of 
domination and the exercise of power in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in schools, 
barracks, prisons, and factories, then how was it to be distinguished from earlier monastic 
and spiritual forms of discipline that existed in philosophical and religious contexts for 
millennia, those forms of self-discipline that he would come to umbrella under the terms 
ascesis and the care of the self? Foucault’s answer in 1975, however provisional and 
speculative at the time, was that the function of monastic discipline “was to obtain 
renunciations rather than increases of utility … which, although they involved obedience to 
others, had as their principal aim an increase of the mastery of each individual over his own 
body” (DP 137). Whereas monastic discipline aimed at self-mastery, the freedom of oneself 
in relation to one’s body, disciplinary power in the modern age makes obedience coextensive 
with utility; rather than liberating the self and the body, discipline then represents the human 
body’s entrance into “a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it” 
(138). In making obedience utterly correlative with utility, discipline achieves a dissociation 
of the body and power whereby the body is turned into a vector of political and economic 
forces, obedience and utility; the body becomes an pure “aptitude” and “capacity” (138). 
 This transformation of the body into a capacity correlates with the invention of what I 
have been calling feeling-substances. While the Christian mechanisms of fear and shame 
functioned as feeling-practices for the interiorization of the self and the religious ethic of 
obedience, the transformation of the body into a vector of capacity parallels the much later 
invention of the psychological category of emotion.  This new truth of the subject and of 120
the body would be distinct from earlier understandings of the passions of the soul in antiquity 
and the medieval period; emotions, in contrast, are mental states rooted in physiological 
dynamics of the body. From Descartes’ use of “émotions” in Les Passions de l’âme through 
David Hume and other Scottish Empiricists like David Hartley (1705-1757) and Thomas 
 For a discussion of the invention of emotion as a psychological category, see Thomas Dixon, From Passions 120
to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003).
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Brown, the word “emotion” would transform from denoting social and civil unrest and the 
violent stirrings of nature witnessed in phenomena like earthquakes to a psychological 
category of mental states related to physiological expressions of the brain and body.  This 121
shift in the understanding of feelings and the invention of a science of emotion corresponds 
to a shift in the way feelings interacted with sovereign power and disciplinary power in the 
eighteenth century. In sovereign forms of punishment such as execution and torture that 
Foucault describes at the outset of Discipline and Punish, power interacts with feeling briefly 
and spectacularly as the manifestation of the truth and power of the sovereign. Feeling, felt as 
the excruciating pain and agony of the criminal—the affected body—, briefly becomes the 
spectacle and occasion for the legibility of power. In contrast, disciplinary power’s 
interaction with feeling shifts from being brief, occasional, and spectacular, to being 
durational, intentional, and quotidian. Feeling-substances become mobilized as legible marks 
of the soldier’s discipline, as Foucault describes at the beginning of the chapter “Docile 
Bodies,” demonstrating courage, pride, and valour (DP 135). Power no longer interacts with 
feeling as the spectacular inscription of the sovereign on the body of the juridical subject; 
rather, discipline represents power’s investment in the body and feeling as a pure capacity, 
spread over a duration of time and extension of space, enabling the work of shaping 
individuals and subjectivities: the soldier who is courageous, the student eager, the prisoner 
contrite. Here alongside docile bodies we find docile emotions. In becoming correlated with 
bodily capacity, feelings and emotions, as docile and objectified physiological substances, are 
inserted into a vast machinery of disciplinary power.  
 While the body becomes transformed as a vector of capacity and feeling is 
transformed as a physiological substance, “Western man’s” relation to himself becomes 
drilled by a relation to one’s feelings as a relation to the body. Feelings are now bodily 
capacities and substances, rather than practices through which a truth of the self and 
existence may be derived. Similarly, the emergence of governmentality as the modern raison 
d’État for the management of the capacities of the population is accompanied by new 
articulations of the nation. For seventeenth century political theorists like Thomas Hobbes (as 
well as his Leveller and Digger rivals like John Warr) and historians like Henri de 
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Boulainvilliers (1658-1722), the nation is founded on relations of conquest and war,  an 122
account that would later influence French historians François Guizot (1787-1847) and 
Augustin Thierry (1795-1856) and eventually Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’ concept of 
class war.  But alongside these politico-historical discourses there emerges a more 123
dominant account of the nation that would influence the French Revolution. Rather than the 
nation comprising an encrustation of relations of hierarchies between victor and vanquished 
classes or races, Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès (1748-1836), Catholic priest and theorist of the 
Revolution, argues in the influential pamphlet Qu’est-ce que le Tiers-Etat (1789), that 
nationhood is constituted by the social functions and institutions that give it the capacity to 
govern itself: agriculture, commerce, education, the army, the church, the magistrature, 
industry, laws and legislature, etc. all of which belong by and large to the bourgeois classes 
that make up the Third Estate.  Governmentality emerges during this period in tandem with 124
changing understandings of the nation as comprised by social capacities rather than sovereign 
rights of conquest. Now, the State’s relationship to the nation is no longer simply predicated 
on the maintenance and protection of the rights of conquest, but on the social capacities that 
are the condition of nationhood. The State’s role, then, is to manage, improve, and optimize 
these social capacities. Rather than defending or expanding the sovereign’s territory, as in 
 See Foucault’s discussion of relations of war in Hobbes in Society Must Be Defended, 89-94; also see 122
Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. J. C. A. Gaskin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 84-86; “Hereby it is manifest, 
that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which 
is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man” (84). For Foucault’s discussion of the 
Levellers, Diggers, and John Warr see Society Must Be Defended, 107-109; also see John Warr, The Corruption 
and Deficiency of the Laws of England (London, 1649), 1: “The laws of England are full of tricks, doubts, and 
contrary to themselves; for they were invented and established by the Normans, which were of all nations the 
most quarrelsome and most fallacious in contriving of controversies and suits.” For Foucault’s discussion of 
relations of war in Boulainvilliers’s “political historicism” see Society Must Be Defended, 155-160; for 
Boulainvilliers’s historical works that Foucault references see also p. 140n22.
 For Foucault’s discussion of “national duality” and the role of relations of war, power, and struggle in the 123
histories of political and social institutions by Guizot and Thierry see Society Must Be Defended, 226. Foucault 
quotes Guizot summarizing this thinking in the latter’s Du Gouvernement de la France depuis la Restauration 
et du ministre actuel (Paris, 1820), 1: “For more than thirteen centuries, France contained two peoples: a 
victorious people and a vanquished people.” Foucault also cites a letter that Marx wrote to J. Weydemeyer on 5 
March 1852, in which he remarks that Thierry and Guizot were engaged in a “history of classes”; and in another 
letter to Engels on 27 July 1854 Marx claimed that Thierry was “the father of the ‘class struggle’”; see p. 85n6.
 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 218-222. See also Joseph Sieyès, “What Is the Third Estate?” In 124
Political Writings, ed. Michael Sonenscher (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2003) 92-162; “What is a nation? 
It is a body of associates living under a common law, represented by the same legislature, etc.” (97); “The Third 
Estate thus encompasses everything pertaining to the Nation, and everyone outside the Third Estate cannot be 
considered to be a member of the Nation” (98).
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earlier centuries, for example, modern States begin to wage wars on the basis of improving 
the conditions of commerce or industry or for the purposes of racist nationalisms promoting 
the superiority of the race or “national interests.” Once biopolitics begins to permeate 
Western societies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, sovereign rights of violence and 
war collide with governmental efforts to optimize the social capacities of the nation, with 
horrific consequences. Racism, eugenics, and genocide develop as biopolitical means of 
improving social capacities and imposing population norms at the expense of perceived 
enemies, intruders, or degeneracies.  
 In the second half of the twentieth century, the rise of neoliberalism deepens this 
managerial governmentality through the discursive framework provided by the scientia 
affectus, extending the management of bodily capacity to the affective relations that run 
through the social fabric. As Foucault remarks in a 1981 interview, “we live in a relational 
world that institutions have considerably impoverished. Society and the institutions which 
frame it have limited the possibility of relationships because a rich relational world would be 
very complex to manage.”  Discipline becomes automatized, and its dual aims of obedience 125
and utility become the apparently voluntary projects of willing subjects. In turn, affective 
relations are restricted, as much as possible, to relations of economy. The governmental 
rationality of optimizing obedience and utility becomes integrated as the subject’s relation to 
herself: homo oeconomicus, “entrepreneur of the self.” What’s more, the intensification of the 
body as a vector of capacity reaches new levels with neoliberalism’s governing principle of 
“human capital,” which Foucault talks about at length in The Birth of Biopolitics lectures of 
1979. Formulated by Chicago school economists T. W. Schultz and Gary Becker, human 
capital designates a rationality for measuring the economic value of human capacities, skills, 
and abilities.  Foucault, following Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus (1972), calls human 126
capital an ability-machine that renders indissociable income and all aspects of the human life 
 Michel Foucault, “The Social Triumph of the Sexual Will,” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 158. 125
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that bears it.  So when homo oeconomicus, the “eminently governable” subject of 127
neoliberalism, learns a skill or trade, she invests in her human capital; when she exercises her 
body and improves her health, she invests in her human capital; and when she marries and 
has children and teaches them how to lead happy, healthy, and productive lives, she invests in 
the human capital of her offspring and the genetic human capital of the population. All areas 
of human life become understood through an economic “grid of intelligibility,” of 
investment, growth, and return on profit; even the affection that one shows to one’s children 
becomes a form of economic investment.  It is within this context, of a rationality that 128
reduces all areas of human life and feeling to an economic ratio, a logic of expenses and 
profits, that business and managerial discourses like “emotional intelligence” emerge, as 
popularized by science writer and business guru Daniel Goleman.  Simultaneously, 129
concepts like Arlie Hochschild’s “emotional labour” represent attempts to grapple with the 
massive shift taking place in the way power relates to feeling, how the government of feeling 
has come to condition modern subjectivity and the relationship with the self.   130
 For reasons that are not independent of power, economy, and government, “Western 
man” now works on his feelings as he does his body. Feeling enters that “machinery of power 
that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it” (DP 138). That is to say, feeling has 
become an object of government, a space of power and its contest. Refusal of the 
governement of feeling, then, does not occur through a simple refusal of feeling tout court, 
but contesting and refusing particular relations of power and government on the basis of 
feeling and the relationship with one’s feelings. Refusal is diffused and entails a particular 
way of reinventing how one might relate to one’s feelings, how one might derive truth from 
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one’s feelings. The bifurcated extremes of accepting or refusing feeling are not an option; 
instead, feeling inheres in Sedgwick’s “middle ranges of agency” and denotes all those 
partial, local, and middle registers of refusal. 
2.3: Iran, 1978 
In the previous section I alluded to a slight shift in Foucault’s interest in governmentality and 
Christianity between the 1978 lectures and the 1980 lectures, a shift from emphasizing 
governmental relations of pastoral power to more general themes of spiritual direction. His 
growing interest in spirituality could be attributed to his journey to Japan, practicing Zen 
Buddhism with renowned Rinzai Rōshi, Omori Sogen (1904-1944).  Foucault also became 131
dissatisfied with the crowded and busy lineups at his usual Bibliothèque Nationale and began 
conducting his research at the Bibliothèque du Saulchoir, a Dominican Order library whose 
extensive collection of works from antiquity and the Church Fathers sustained his interest in 
early Christianity.  But this shift was partly also accompanied by the rather tumultuous 132
personal and professional years in Foucault’s life between Security, Territory, Population 
(1978) and On the Government of the Living (1980). His relationship with many friends and 
colleagues had become strained. In part, this was due to his refusal to endorse the actions of 
the West German Red Army Faction (known by the media as the Baader-Meinhof Group), a 
far-left militant organization that engaged in terrorist activity until its dissolution in the 90s 
after the fall of the Soviet Union. While he participated in protests against the extradition of 
one of their defence lawyers, Klaus Croissant, his unwillingness to endorse the group’s 
actions led to a falling out with friends who had voiced support for the group itself, notably 
Deleuze, Guattari, and Jean Genet.  Even more, Foucault’s series of visits to Iran and his 133
articles in support of the revolution taking place earned considerable rebuke from the 
Parisian press and many of his friends, an event that would ultimately discourage him from 
pursuing similar forms of journalism in the future. In particular, his optimism for what he 
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called a “political spirituality” fuelling the revolution would prove to be remarkably naive in 
the wake of the reactionary theocratic regime that took power precisely because of the 
religious fervour that Foucault had admired. Had his trenchant critiques of modernity led him 
to an unwitting support for reactionary and regressive politics?   134
 I will conclude this chapter with a few remarks. First, while the notion of “political 
spirituality” in relation to “Islamic government” in Iran reflects a naive understanding of the 
currents and socio-political contexts of Islamism that had been taking place in the decades 
preceding the Iranian Revolution, for Foucault it represents a more general political will for 
discovering new ways of governing oneself and new practices of dividing the true from the 
false. What fascinated Foucault about the Iranian Revolution was how a basically non-violent 
collective political will could topple a brutal and authoritarian State. Fuelling that collective 
political will in Foucault’s eyes was a refusal of forms of government and ways of relating to 
the self and others that were prescribed by the liberal democracies and secular humanisms of 
the West. The history of the Christian West, on the other hand, has achieved a progressive 
separation of questions of the subjectivity and truth, and with it, spirituality from political 
knowledge. The whole question of how the subject can transform him or herself has become 
separate from the question of how truth can be known, to the degree that this separation is 
synonymous with historical progress and its telos, rather than itself being the product of 
history. In that sense, the “political spirituality” of the Iranian Revolution can be understood 
as a refusal of teleological history.  Yet Foucault overestimated the power of that refusal to 135
sustain the invention of genuinely new politics and new ways of relating to the self and 
others. But in any case, in Foucault’s final article on Iran he argues passionately that such 
refusals are irreducible to the laws of history. “Uprisings belong to history, but in a certain 
way, they escape it” : 136
 This is the argument advanced by Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson in Foucault and the Iranian 134
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A delinquent puts his life on the line against abusive punishment, a madman cannot 
stand anymore being closed in and pushed down, or a people rejects a regime that 
oppresses it. This does not make the first one innocent, does not cure the second, and 
does not guarantee to the third the results that were promised. No one, by the way, is 
required to stand in solidarity with them. No one is required to think that these 
confused voices sing better than others and speak the truth in its ultimate depth. It is 
enough that they exist and that they have against them all that strives to silence them, 
to make it meaningful to listen to them and to search for what they want to say. A 
question of morality? Perhaps. A question of reality, certainly. All the disillusionments 
of history will not change this. It is precisely because there are such voices that 
human time does not take the form of evolution, but that of “history.”  137
The refusal to obey is powerful: a feeling; but it does not need to be a clear and sophisticated 
refusal of a totality of forces. Political refusal disappoints often and rarely fulfils its promises. 
But the feelings that accompany and determine refusal, and its times of crises, make history 
elude the logic of any teleological arc. History is time punctured by singularity, refusal, and 
feeling. 
 Refusal, then, is the occasion for a new “political spirituality,” which represents a 
search for new foundations of truth practices. In a discussion that does not involve the Iranian 
Revolution but is contemporary with it, Foucault defines this “political spirituality” fourfold 
as a set of questions according to an analytics of historicism, epistemology, history, and 
ethics or politics:  
First, in what sense is the production and transformation of the true/false division 
characteristic and decisive for our historicity? Second, in what specific ways has this 
relation operated in Western societies, which produce scientific knowledge whose 
forms are perpetually changing and whose values are posited as universal? Third, 
what historical knowledge is possible of a history that itself produces the true/false 
distinction on which such knowledge depends? Fourth, isn't the most general of 
 Ibid, 266.137
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political problems the problem of truth? How can one analyze the connection between 
ways of distinguishing true and false and ways of governing oneself and others?  138
“Political spirituality,” then, consists in following these four lines of analysis and asks a more 
practical and “spiritual” question (“spiritual” insofar as it involves the transformation of 
truth, consciousness, and the field of experience): How can one endeavour “to discover a 
different way of governing oneself through a different way of dividing up true and false”?   139
 While I have attempted to show in this chapter how a government of feeling emerges 
in the modern age that is predicated on an understanding of the subject as a subject of feeling, 
what remains to be shown is how this government of feeling, and the regimes of power it 
entails, interact with a field of truth and knowledge of the individual. For “there is no power 
relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that 
does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (DP 27). How, then, has 
it occurred that the government of feeling, this “specific mode of subjection,” “was able to 
give birth to man as an object of knowledge for a discourse with a ‘scientific status’” (24). 
The scientific objectification that subtends the government of feeling would thus entail a 
scientia affectus, distinct from the feeling-practices or ars pathetica of antiquity. Undertaking 
an analysis of a scientia affectus would primarily involve the first three questions leading to 
“political spirituality”: how divisions of truth and falsity inhere in our own historicity, in 
what conditions of possibility of knowledge are available for history, and what we can know 
about history given its own divisions of the true and the false. This is the task I will take up in 
the third chapter. But in tackling the first three questions of “political spirituality” the goal is 
to keep an eye trained to the “will to discover a different way of governing oneself,” a 
different way of relating to one’s feelings, and, hence, a shift from refusal to innovation. 
 To begin, I will discuss Massumi’s argument for the transhistoricity of affect and his 
recourse to the naivety of sensation. In contrast, I suggest that Foucault’s archaeological 
analyses represent methods for understanding the historicity of feeling that maintain no 
pretensions of evading the question of the subject, and thus, demonstrating the historicity of 
the subject without admitting to any determinism of the subject or history. From then, I 
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discuss the historical emergence of the consciousness of feeling as an immanent truth of the 
subject, which is an emergence bound up with the history of madness, the passions, and the 
elusive category of unreason, as well as the developments of psychology and psychiatry. I 
give brief sketches of two key feelings (guilt and melancholy) that play a unique role in 
opening the interiority and space for the truth of modern man, as well as the precarious 
foundations upon which modern man is born and is destined to fade. This destiny, in my 
reading, is precisely the memory of an ars pathetica that has been superseded and mutated by 
a scientia affectus. The question of “political spirituality” then would entail that this 
deafening memory of an ars pathetica itself be overcome in favour of an ethics and politics 
of innovation. How, and to what end, can one endeavour to relate to one’s feelings and those 
of others, as, once more, a relation of art and style rather than as a psychological 
determination of personality or mental illness? 
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Chapter Three: History and Scientia Affectus 
“You have a history,” she said, “that you are responsible to.” 
“What do you mean by responsible to?” 
“You’re responsible to it. You’re answerable. You’re required to try to make sense of it. You 
owe it your complete attention.” 
— Underworld  140
3.1: Innovation, Style, and the Historical Mutability of Feeling 
Brian Massumi’s 2002 book, Parables for the Virtual, which has since become a staple for 
affect theory, attempts to unravel the problem of how the individual and society relate to each 
other in the vein of a chicken-and-the-egg paradox: “Which came first? The individual or 
society?”  Massumi’s schematic and cursory breakdown of this problem suggests three 141
dominant approaches to this question in philosophy and the social sciences. The first is 
associated with a classical liberal theory and claims that the individual represents the 
antecessor and foundation of society, “conjur[ing] away society with the fiction of an 
atomistic flock of individuals who forge a relation with one another on the basis of a 
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normative recognition of shared needs and common goods.”  Society is the manifestation 142
and expression of relations between individuals. The second approach emerges, for Massumi, 
from deconstructionist critiques of the first approach, and claims that society comes before 
the individual: “the inaugural gesture in this case is to conjure away the individual in order 
for it to return as determined by society rather than determining of it. The individual is 
defined by its ‘positioning' within the intersubjective frame.”  The individual, then, 143
represents an object-position within a larger social structure or framework. But given these 
two approaches, how are we to understand how society changes over time or how individuals 
can change themselves in relation to the society around them? Are we determined to be mere 
functions of our society and our history with no ability to turn around and objectively critique 
the society around us? Or if society is merely the projection of willing individuals, then how 
do we explain social phenomena that appear to function independent of the voluntary consent 
of individuals, phenomena such as systemic racism or heteronormativity? Anticipating these 
problems between the two approaches, Massumi hypothesizes a “mutant” position (he does 
not say when, except that its emergence is recent) that conceives the relation between society 
and the individual as a sort of you’re-in-or-you’re-out situation, albeit with ample room for 
the fringes, the margins, “border culture,” and hybridity. “The ultimate aim,” Massumi 
writes, “is to find a place for change again, for social innovation, which had been squeezed 
out of the nest by the pincer movement of the needful or reasonable determination of a 
legislative norm on one side and topographical determination by a constitutive positionality 
on the other.”  The problem with this approach, which Massumi seems to identify with 144
queer and feminist theory, is that it defines hybridity and marginality only in relation to a 
dominant centre or determining progenitor. Innovation, then, is not understood in itself and 
without foundation or determinism, but simply as deviance, negation, and subversion. 
Determination reemerges as a central reference point for change. 
 Here we are in similar territory to Sedgwick’s “middle ranges of agency,” which 
raises the question of how change and creativity can be understood outside of a simple 
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negation or subversion of a totalized and hegemonic status quo. While they construct 
somewhat different vocabularies, both Sedgwick and Massumi look to affect to articulate the 
regions of ambiguity and “in-betweenness” in the relations of the individual and society. 
Massumi’s intervention aims to give an account of change while avoiding all recourse to 
determination.  How do we understand change in itself, without determination, for if 145
change were determined would it then not merely be causality? His solution is to provide a 
“logical consistency” and “ontological status” of the “in-between,” similar to how Sedgwick 
sought the “middle ranges of agency” in Tomkins’ affect theory. This means accounting for 
the being of relation in a way that does not subordinate either the relation to the relata (as in 
the first approach) or the relata to the relation (as in the second approach). Furthermore, it 
means avoiding the pitfalls of the third approach by understanding relata as something other 
than merely a position relative to the relation. On the contrary, Massumi argues, “it is only by 
asserting the exteriority of the relation to its terms that chicken and egg absurdities can be 
avoided and the discussion diverted from an addiction to foundation and its negation to an 
engagement with change as such, with the unfounded and unmediated in-between of 
becoming.”  What comes first is neither the chicken nor the egg, but the ontological fact of 146
their relation and belonging to one another. Evolution ensues not from the egg or the chicken 
but in their relation and in their belonging, as “differential emergences from the shared realm 
of relationality that is one with becoming.”  And it is via this account of the in-between and 147
relational belonging as extrinsic to relata, that Massumi attempts to underscore an ontology 
of becoming and change. Massumi then attempts to grant ontological status to becoming-in-
relationality through another extended metaphor: soccer.  What follows is a rich discussion 148
of the ontology of games, rules, and the relations between actors, space, sensation, and 
movement—a discussion that incidentally wanders into some familiar territory for Foucault, 
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for whom the games and rules of truth had long been an important analytic tool for his 
understanding of power and knowledge.  However, for Massumi, the sensory and affective 149
space of the “in-between” has a very different relation to history than the ars pathetica 
envisioned by Foucault. 
 To begin, Massumi makes it clear that rules do not precede the game but instead 
emerge from it and continue to evolve as the game evolves, even while the rules attempt to 
contain and regulate the proper form of the game.  If not the rules, then the condition for 150
the game and its play is the field, with its boundaries and goal-posts, which act as “inductive 
signs” that produce the “the polar attraction,” driving the game.  Massumi: “put two teams 151
on a grassy field with goals at either end and you have an immediate, palpable tension.”  152
The field, goal-posts, and the players form a sort of inductive force field for play. What 
“catalyzes” the play, however, is the ball.  While “the ball is the focus of every player and 153
the object of every gesture,” this is only a superficial appearance, for the ball directs the 
movements, positions, and gestures of the players, the speed of their runs and the strength 
and tact of their kicks: “the ball arrays the teams around itself. Where and how it bounces 
differentially potentializes and depotentializes the entire field, intensifying and deintensifying 
the exertions of the players and the movements of the team.”  Rather than thinking of the 154
player as the subject of activity and the ball the object, Massumi writes, “the ball is the 
subject of the play. … The player is the object of the ball.”   155
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The kick is indeed an expression, but not of the player. It is an ‘ex-pression’ of the 
ball, in the etymological sense, since the ball's attractive catalysis ‘draws out’ the kick 
from the player's body and defines its expressive effect on the globality of the game. 
The player's body is a node of expression, not a subject of the play but a material 
channel for the catalysis of an event affecting the global state of the game.  156
Now, this does not mean that the ball determines the player’s movement, but simply that it 
catalyzes it while the field and goal posts induce or influence the player’s movement. Hence, 
Massumi is clear that the ball and player do not exhaust each other; the ball is the “part-
subject” and the player is the “part-object”  in a series of events in which, strictly speaking, 157
they belong to one another. If the goals induce play, and the ball catalyzes it, then the player 
“transduces” play by translating their energy and motion into effective events within the 
game as a whole. 
 However, this rather rich discussion runs into a few problems. First, there no doubt 
would have to have been a time, before the codification of an official set of rules, where the 
players decided that there would be two teams, two goals belonging to each team, one ball, 
and that the object of the game is to kick the ball into the other team’s goal. This may have 
evolved from an earlier game that perhaps involved only one goal, or that involved running 
with the ball in hand rather than kicking it. But give or take a few variations, this set of 
evolving deliberations might very well be considered the proto-rules. For it makes little sense 
to argue, as Massumi seems to suggest, that the goals and field would appear as if by accident 
and, through a power that belongs only to them, manifest the polar tension that induces the 
play. Is not some deliberation inevitable? This problem is compounded when Massumi makes 
an important distinction between reflexivity and reflectivity. Massumi starts by making a 
fairly commonplace observation that most of us are probably familiar with: overthinking. 
When the players becomes too self-conscious of themselves as they are kicking the ball, they 
are more likely to miss. But unfortunately, he equates overthinking with self-consciousness 
and reflectivity as categorically distinct from reflexivity:  
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The players, in the heat of the game, are drawn out of themselves. Any player who is 
conscious of himself as he kicks, misses. Self-consciousness is a negative condition 
of the play. … [The player] is reflexively (rather than reflectively) assessing the 
potential movement of the ball. … The player must let his trained body synthesize his 
separate perceptual impressions into a global sense of the intensity. The sensing of the 
intensity will be vague but goal-directed in such a way as to draw a maximally exact 
reflex expression from him.  158
This passage makes a number of leaps. First, while overthinking becomes equated with self-
consciousness tout court, this inhibiting self-consciousness becomes contrasted to reflexivity. 
Training, which may very well be considered a domain where self-conscious deliberation 
plays an important role, simply becomes the occasion for synthesizing perception and 
sensation as a reflexive expression of play. Then, play becomes qualified as sensory 
reflexivity distinct from self-conscious deliberation. In turn, the entire work, dedication, and 
art of training—what Foucault would call ascesis—becomes elided in Massumi’s 
overdetermination of the role of sensation and reflex. To make things worse, Massumi’s 
absolute distinction between self-consciousness and reflexive sensation allows him to remove 
the problem of subjectivity from play entirely: “the player's subjectivity is disconnected as he 
enters the field of potential in and as its sensation. For the play, the player is that 
sensation.”  Subjectivity no longer has a role in play except as an inhibition. Besides 159
disallowing the possibility that subjectivity is in fact a form of reflexivity—as Foucault 
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argues —this has the effect of escaping the risks and difficulties involved in subjectivity, 160
escaping the whole question of training and forming oneself as a subject, and fleeing into a 
pure and ideal region of sensation and reflex devoid of any relation to subjectivity, its work, 
its art, and its feelings.  
 While Massumi’s description allows the influence of “shimmers of reflection and 
language” to bear on perception and sensation in the form of memory and “pregame 
strategy,”  it still occludes questions of the role of art, ascesis, and training in the formation 161
of subjectivity. Does art form the appropriate strategy or is it subtractive and inhibitive? In 
separating out subjectivity and sensation and allowing the former to influence the latter only 
in an inhibitive fashion or as the product of memory, Massumi’s description risks 
impoverishing both subjectivity and sensation and their actual co-belonging. Sensation 
becomes artless, while subjectivity becomes lifeless. The problem is not that Massumi 
figures the player as an object of play, but rather the problem inheres in describing the player 
as a “material channel” for play  in a way that denies the integral involvement of the 162
player’s training, art, and tactical know-how in the dynamics of play. When Massumi does 
get around to this question of art in terms of style, he divorces style from technique, 
something surely no athlete could agree with. Massumi: “style is what makes the player. 
What makes a player a star is more than perfection of technique. Technical perfection merely 
makes a player most competent. To technical perfection the star adds something extra.”  163
 “The subject himself, as constituted by the form of reflexivity specific to this or that type of care of the self, 160
will be modified. Consequently, we should not constitute a continuous history of the gnōthi seauton whose 
explicit or  implicit postulate would be a general and universal theory of the subject, but should, I think, begin 
with an analytics of the forms of reflexivity, inasmuch as it is the forms of reflexivity that constitute the subject 
as such” (HS 462). Thus, Foucault’s late turn to the subject is partly a correction of universal theories of the 
subject which would figure subjective consciousness, its truth, obligations, and needs as the foundation of 
history and society in the fashion Massumi attributes to classical liberalism. But rather than entailing the death 
of the subject, for Foucault, this correction more exactly discredits philosophies of sovereign subjectivity. 
Instead, Foucault conceives the subject as various “forms of reflexivity” in which the subject’s truth and field of 
experience itself undergoes historical transformations in tandem with the subject’s freedom and ethical conduct. 
Here, freedom throws into question any law of social or historical determinism without serving a foundational 
and universal role in subjective and social change. Against Massumi, however, figuring subjectivity as 
synonymous with reflectivity, rather than a form of reflexivity, leads to an impoverished understanding of the 
subject and provokes a recourse to the naivety of sensation.
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This “extra” is essentially a je ne sais quoi, a little flick here, a feint or maybe a spin there. 
Yet style effectively games the rules, adding the slightest variations to the play in order to 
gain an advantage over the opponent. Thus, “a star's style is always a provocation to the 
referee.”  Style, then, is where the freedom of the subject would clash with the codified 164
rules of the game, provoking either other players to develop different strategies and 
techniques or the officials to create new rules. In any case, style engenders new ways of 
playing the game. And yet, the whole question of an ars pathetica, the difficulty, the work 
and feeling (feelings such as courage, pride, or tenacity) involved in developing and honing 
an advantageous style is abandoned by Massumi’s denial of the self-conscious reflection 
involved in training, art, and technique. So when Massumi finally concludes that “it is 
through stylistic, free variations that an already-constituted sport evolves,”  he is unable to 165
account for the actual emergence of style itself, the ostensible lynchpin in the being of 
change, for which he wishes to provide an ontological consistency. 
 Despite the question of how the individual relates to the game (or society) remaining 
unanswered, Massumi’s line of thinking here poses problems for his wider affect theory. 
Because Massumi sees affect as beyond “the sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of an 
experience”  the player’s affect is juxtaposed to self-conscious deliberation, training, and 166
art, and therefore divorced from any ars pathetica or practices of feeling. Affect is thus 
distinguished from the way in which the subject plays the game, or to carry the metaphor full 
circle, how the subject lives and understands truth and meaning within a given society. 
Massumi’s description of affect as “autonomic, bodily reactions occurring in the brain but 
outside consciousness”  has the effect of sidelining any question of an ars pathetica in 167
favour of a scientia affectus, in which feeling is construed as an external material substance 
for thought, knowledge, and ethics. Ruth Leys, for one, has been a notable critic of Massumi 
for uncritically reproducing outdated or otherwise inconclusive physicalist theories of 
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emotion, even while he maintains a definitive distinction between affect and emotion.  But 168
Massumi’s problem goes beyond miming a scientia affectus. By qualifying the empirical 
human being as a physical transducer or channel of potentiality, which functions on the 
ontological level of the in-between and relational becoming, he effectively reifies the 
empirical or the physical as the ontological and the transcendental. The field of immanence 
that comprises empirical elements (physical bodies, including humans, in space and time) 
becomes extrapolated to the level of fundamental ontology, and thus Massumi is able to 
characterize immanent physicality as transhistorical. Massumi: “although inseparable from 
the empirical elements … the field of immanence is superempirical. … As a dimension of 
becoming, gathering proto-, present, and post-, it is also transhistorical—uncontainable in the 
closure of any particular historical moment.”  Historical and subjective change is possible, 169
then, only because there is an immanent bedrock of physicality, sensation, and perception that 
is irreducible to history. Thus, following the “death of the subject,” Massumi essentially 
refashions a vague, totally physical and yet “superempirical” “subject” that remains exterior 
to history. This amounts to an impoverishment of the actual historicity of the subject, which 
Massumi abandons in favour of a pure ahistorical subject of sensation. In my reading, the 
transhistoricity of immanence is the price Massumi pays for attempting to conceive an 
ontology of becoming on the basis of an occlusion of the subject of ars pathetica. If Massumi 
favours a scientia affectus, extrapolated to the superempirical level of ontology, over an ars 
pathetica, then this comes at the cost of excluding both the subject and history, as well as the 
whole question of the historicity of feeling.  
 In light of this irreconcilable problem of feeling and historicity in Massumi, I propose 
that Foucault’s historical methodology provides a very different account of the inextricability 
of feeling and history—and without conceding a determinate or exterior relation between 
them. In contrast, Foucault’s historical methodology entails that feeling and history abide in a 
fundamental relation of asymmetry and discontinuity. In “Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History” (1971), he writes: 
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We believe that feelings are immutable, but every sentiment, particularly the noblest 
and most disinterested, has a history. We believe in the dull constancy of instinctual 
life and imagine that it continues to exert its force indiscriminately in the present as it 
did in the past. But knowledge of history easily disintegrates this unity, depicts its 
wavering course, locates its moment of strength and weakness, and defines its 
oscillating reign. It easily seizes the slow elaboration of instincts and those 
movements where, in turning upon themselves, they relentlessly set about their self-
destruction. We believe, in any event, that the body obeys the exclusive laws of 
physiology and that it escapes the influence of history, but this too is false. The body 
is molded by a great many distinct regimes; it is broken down by the rhythms of 
work, rest, and holidays; it is poisoned by food or values, through eating habits or 
moral laws; it constructs resistances… History [is] without constants. Nothing in man
—not even his body—is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or 
for understanding other men.  170
While history never ceases to mold and break down the body, its instincts and its feelings, 
Foucault recognizes there is no strict law of determination. Bodily feelings and instincts 
(what Massumi might call affect) become seized by the laws, values, habits, and regimes of 
history in such a way as to prompt feeling to turn back upon itself in a movement of self-
destruction that permits the elaboration of new feelings and affects. This self-reflexivity of 
feeling ensures that its mutability is not under the sole ownership of objective history, or the 
sort of top-down power expressed via law. Rather, the mutability of feeling follows from its 
asymmetrical relationship with history. Ultimately, history owes its character of discontinuity, 
its stop-start development of mutating experiences and worldviews, not to the evolutionary 
path of a universal telos, nor to the transhistorical immanence of materiality, physicality, or 
sensation, but to the mutable self-reflexivity of feeling itself. The body “constructs 
resistances” and in turn, “history is without constants.”   171
 The “knowledge of history easily disintegrates [the] unity” of the immutability of 
affect, feelings, the body, and instinctual life. This disintegration is precisely the intervention 
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Foucault’s genealogical method aims to achieve. And in turn, by disintegrating the 
supposedly immutable laws of transhistorical feeling, genealogy endeavours to innovate new 
ways of feeling and new forms of experience. Huffer likes quoting Nietzsche on this point: 
“we have to learn to think differently - in order at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even 
more! to feel differently.  And while Foucault’s genealogy is sometimes considered to be a 172
break with his earlier methodology of archaeology, his commitment to a historical 
methodology that throws into question the necessity of historical development in order to 
make possible new ways of feeling and thinking is one of the few constants throughout 
Foucault’s oeuvre. Speaking on his idea of an “experience book,” which he attributes 
especially to his early archeologies, History of Madness and The Birth of the Clinic, he says 
that he wants his works to be “an experience” through which “you come out of changed. I 
write precisely because I don’t know yet what to think about a subject that attracts my 
interest. In so doing, the book transforms me, changes what I think.”  In an interview nearly 173
eight months before his death, Foucault says, “one writes to become someone other than who 
one is.”  Even going back all the way to his first published article in 1953, an introduction 174
to the French translation of Ludwig Binswanger’s Dream and Existence, Foucault reserves 
this power of innovation for an ontological analysis of history that would aim to free the 
imagination and expression from being alienated and ossified in the static images that 
constitute objective historical becoming. Such an analysis finds in the movement of 
imagination and expression an existential freedom in which one can “rediscover and 
recognize” oneself in the “law” of the “heart”: “these feelings, this desire, this drive to spoil 
the simplest things.”  In turn, “the image is no longer of something, totally projected toward 175
an absence which it replaces; rather, it is gathered into itself and is given the fullness of a 
presence, it is addressed to someone. Now, the image appears as a modality of expression, 
and achieves its meaning as a ‘style,’ … But here we are already speaking in the register of 
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history.”  Historical ontology turns over the empirical succession of historical events, 176
therein deciphering the movement of expression, imagination, and feeling, and converts them 
into modalities of style and art, setting free the image and delivering it to the other. In this 
way, Foucault’s point of departure for his entire intellectual project is in attending to the 
freedom of expression through history in order to transform the dead and alienating images 
of history into a cascade of styles and arts of feeling and expression. And thus, in envisioning 
the images of objective history into the ontological movements of expression and freedom 
the goal once again is to show that we are “much freer than [we] feel.”  177
 For Massumi and Foucault, change and innovation inhere in style, but in completely 
different ways. For Massumi, style occurs on the ontological level of transhistoricity and is 
juxtaposed with subjectivity. For Foucault, the consciousness of style emerges from the 
historicization of ontology, through which it becomes synonymous with subjectivity, in the 
form of the arts and styles of existence that preoccupied Foucault’s interest in the final years 
of his life. For Massumi, innovation arises from the transhistoricity of style; innovation is the 
transhistorical immanence of style. For Foucault, innovation follows from the confrontation 
with history, in a movement through which necessity and inevitability are converted into 
style; thus, innovation is the historical consciousness of style. This may very well be an 
irreconcilable disagreement between Massumi and Foucault about the nature of history, 
subjectivity, and the im/mutability of feeling or affect. But what I would like to show in the 
remainder of this chapter is how Massumi’s assumptions about the transhistoricity of affect 
and his privileging of a scientia affectus over an ars pathetica in fact has a history dating 
back to the last four centuries. While I have argued in the previous chapters that Foucault’s 
work on technologies of the self in antiquity demonstrates the role of an ars pathetica, which 
loses ground by the modern age in favour of a government of feeling, the focus of the 
remainder of this chapter will set sights on the emergence of a scientia affectus that functions 
as a correlative to the government of feeling in the relations between knowledge and power. 
How, in other words, does an art of feeling become a science of affect? By historicizing the 
categories and experiences of feeling, emotion, and affect that we tend to assume are 
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immutable aspects of human life, the point is to endeavour to elaborate different experiences 
of feeling, to innovate new ways of feeling, if only on the basis of learning to think 
differently about history, about subjectivity, or about the living being of humans. 
3.2: An Archaeology of Feeling 
The possibility of conducting a Foucauldian archaeology of feeling begins with the 
Renaissance. In The Order of Things, Foucault describes the episteme of the Renaissance as 
one of a complex functioning of diverse resemblances between things and words. Thus, he 
writes, “the universe was folded in upon itself: the earth echoing the sky, faces seeing 
themselves reflected in the stars, and plants holding within their stems the secrets that were 
of use to men” (OT 17). Rather than words or concepts representing things, as in the later 
episteme of the European classical age (with the role of language providing sense, meaning, 
and contour to the muteness of things), words and things in the Renaissance relate to 
themselves in a “vast syntax of the world,” in which, “different beings adjust themselves to 
one another; the plant communicates with the animal, the earth with the sea, man with 
everything around him” (18). As such, the soul relates to the body, not as a concept 
representing an immutable essence or substance residing in the body, but as forms in a 
relationship of resemblance which assures their dynamicity. For the episteme of the 
Renaissance, “body and soul … are doubly ‘convenient,’” meaning adjacent and 
intermingling; “the soul had to be made dense, heavy, and terrestrial for God to place it in the 
very heart of matter” (Ibid). Within this resemblant intermingling of soul and body, the 
“passions of the soul” are communicated to the body (Ibid). The seat of the passions is in the 
soul’s resemblance with the body. This resemblance and communication of the passions was 
indebted to humoral medicine dating back to Hippocratic and Galenic medicine of antiquity, 
for which “passion was always the interface between the body and the soul” (HM 225). 
Rather than the passions simply indicating the ambiguity of activity and passivity, as Terada 
points out (see Introduction), historicizing the passions registers an inability to cleanly 
separate an active soul from a passive body (or a passive soul and an active body). The 
passions illuminate the body and the soul’s resemblance and deep communication, their 
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disposition toward each other, in which black and yellow bile, phlegm, and blood conveyed 
the correlative passions which can in turn further agitate the humors. This was effectively an 
experience and perception of the unity of the body and soul “as a form of reciprocal 
causality” (226). This site of intermingling and reciprocality was the condition for an ars 
pathetica, in which feeling is not a representation of physiological or psychological 
phenomena, nor an indelible component of the truth and nature of human existence, but in 
and as the fundamental entanglement of body and soul. The art of ars pathetica means giving 
style and value to that entanglement. 
 This unity of the body and soul through the passions would eventually become 
challenged in the classical age with the advent of Cartesian medicine, exemplified by the 
influence of Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) and the physician François Bayle 
(1622-1709). The Cartesian doctrine of the animal spirits effectively shifted the space of the 
passions from the reciprocity of body and soul to the anteriority of body and soul. When a 
passion erupts in the soul, this is accompanied by the mechanical movements of the animal 
spirits throughout the body, concentrating into the arms or legs in a fearful flight, or burning 
up in the head during a burst of rage.  The soul itself, exemplified in the fit of passion, 178
obeys the mechanical movements that pervade the body, thus entailing a more 
“metaphorical” unity of body and soul (HM 227). Later on in the medicine of the eighteenth 
century, these mechanical movements of the animal spirits will become the tensile states of 
the nervous fibres and the circulations and swellings of fluids (Ibid). But, at least originally, 
the passions, in the Cartesian sense, obey a mechanical movement of the animal spirits 
spread throughout the body, prefiguring its unity with the soul, and determining the 
possibility of their dissolution. For Cartesian medicine, “passion is no longer situated exactly 
at the geometrical centre of the ensemble of the body and soul, but slightly precedes them, in 
a place where they are not yet in opposition, the region when their unity and their 
 On the animal spirits spreading and concentrating throughout the body during fits of passions, Foucault 178
quotes Malebranche: “Before seeing the object of their passion, the animal spirits are spread throughout the 
body in order to preserve all the parts in general, but when a new object appears this whole economy is thrown 
into jeopardy. Most of the spirits are forced into the muscles in the arms, the legs, the face and all the exterior 
parts of the body in order to give it the specific disposition of the dominant passion, and give it the countenance 
and movement necessary for the acquisition of the good, or flight from the evil that has appeared” [Recherche 
de la vérité, book V, chapter III, in Oeuvres complètes, vol. I, ed. Geneviève Rodis-Lewis (Paris: Gallimard, 
Pléiade, 1979), pp. 502-3]. Foucault, History of Madness, 226.
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distinctiveness are both grounded” (227). While the physicians and moralists of previous 
centuries, going back to the Greek and Latin traditions, observed a proximity between the 
passions and madness as a causal relationship, that madness may be a punishment for 
unrestrained passion or that the passions might be a weaker and less severe kind of madness 
(228), this new configuration of the space of the passions prior to the unity of body and soul 
entails a different experience of the proximity of the passions and madness. The passions, no 
longer the simple cause of madness, become instead the general condition of possibility of 
madness (227). “The chimera of madness were to be based on the nature of passion,” and the 
whole problem and pathology of madness was to be placed within “the determinism of the 
passions” (228). As the condition of possibility of madness, the passions signified the portent 
of a fundamental disunity of body and soul (Ibid); madness was the simple occasion in which 
the passions turned on themselves and threw into question the unity of body and soul, and it 
was in this disunity that madness found all those figures and phantasms of the “unreal” that 
had been named variously over the centuries as error, delirium, and hallucination (231).  
 While in medicine the passions begin to presage the disunity of body and soul, the 
perception of language and grammar begins to convey a fundamental relationship between 
the passions and time. The possibility of an analytic knowledge of language is made possible, 
Foucault argues, by the perception that time is inherent in language, not as a memory of the 
historical evolution of languages, but as the linearity and sequences of word order. 
Discussing French grammarians such as Gabriel Girard (1677-1748) and Nicolas Beauzée 
(1717-1789), Foucault observes the identification of the passions in the time of language 
itself. Hence, languages that exhibit a less “analogical” and more spontaneous word order 
follow the direction of the imagination and the passions and so are believed to indicate more 
ancient and less civilized languages (OT 90). Time itself, as an interior component of 
language, begins to convey both the memory and taming of the passions, soon to become 
writ large on the global historical scale. By the end of the eighteenth century anxieties about 
time and the passions began to surface on a widespread level across Europe, accompanied by 
a new historical consciousness of alienation as well as an idealization of nature. Madness 
became, once again, an object of fear and social panic (as it had long been since at least the 
Renaissance), now no longer as a cosmic triumph of man’s inborn unreason and the end of 
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time,  but as a mental disease and relationship with the self and one’s truth specific to the 179
milieu of modern civilization, the abstractions of culture, and the supposed perversions of art 
and literature. The “Age of Sensibility” was accompanied by an adjacent fear of the artificial 
stirring of the passions, in theatre and literature, which were believed to corrupt natural 
sensibility and open the door for all those fragments of the unreal that had been associated 
with madness and nervous illnesses.  Alienated from nature, and thus nature’s reason, 180
modern civilization intimated an experience of the present “surrounded … with a temporal 
halo, an empty milieu, that of leisure and remorse, where men’s hearts were given over to 
worry, and where passions opened time to indifference or repetition” (HM 369). 
 The consciousness and experience of the passions and feeling would thus directly 
entail a perception of time, history, and alienation from nature and reason. Madness was then 
considered the extreme conclusion of the alienated passions of modern civilization. At the 
dawn of the age of Romanticism, “madness became possible in the milieu where man’s 
relation with his feelings, with time and with others was altered, and was made possible by 
the rupture with immediacy in man’s life and his becoming. It was no longer of the order of 
nature nor of the fall, but bore witness instead to a new order, where history began to be 
felt” (HM 371-372). The idea, then, that madness and mental illness had a strong historical, 
 In History of Madness, Foucault documents a shift in thinking about the relationship between madness and 179
death between the Late Medieval period and the Renaissance. In both cases, madness has a direct and tight 
relationship with death and apocalypse: “[w]hereas previously the madness of men had been their incapacity to 
see that the end of life was always near, and it had therefore been necessary to call them back to the path of 
wisdom by means of the spectacle of death, now wisdom meant denouncing folly wherever it was to be found, 
and teaching men that they were already no more than the legions of the dead, and that if the end of life was 
approaching, it was merely a reminder that a universal madness would soon unite with death. This much was 
prophesied by poets like Eustache Deschamps:  
We are cowardly, ill-formed and weak 
Aged, envious and evil-spoken. 
I see only fools and sots 
Truly the end is nigh 
All goes ill. [Oeuvres, ed. Saint-Hilaire de Raymond, vol. 1, p. 203.] (HM 15)
 This medical and moral fear is typified by the writing of French physician Chauvot de Beauchêne 180
(1749-1824), who makes clear a gendered association between the arts, alienation, and nervous illness. Women, 
he writes, are attracted to the passionate spectacles of culture, so that “their soul is so strongly stirred that it 
produces a commotion in their nerves, which may be fleeting, but whose consequences are often most serious. 
The momentary loss of their senses, and the tears that they shed at a performance of one of our modern 
tragedies are the least of the accidents that may then befall them” [De l’influence des affections de l’âme dans 
les maladies nerveuses des femmes, Paris, 1783, p. 33.]. An anonymous contributor to the Gazette salutaire will 
write in 1768 [no. 4, October 6] that “constant reading produces all the diseases of the nerves. Perhaps of all the 
causes that have been harmful to the health of women over the last century, the infinite multiplication of novels 
is the most important… A girl of ten who reads rather than running around will be a woman who suffers from 
the vapours at 20, and not a solid wet nurse” (HM 370-371. 
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social, or even political dimension is not an invention of the twentieth century, but had its 
origins in the moral fears and anxieties of the eighteenth century, with one little known 
physician going as far to say that “to each age its own variety of madness” (377).  It was 181
only subsequent medical knowledge in the nineteenth century that would distance historical 
alienation from madness or mental illness. The medical and psychological experience would 
relegate madness either to the organic determinism of disease or the psychological interiority 
of a moral fault, while Hegelian philosophy and the Marxian analysis of political economy 
would take up the theme of alienation on its own (378). But the medical and psychological 
consciousness of madness would retain from alienation one key aspect, which was that 
madness was definitively no longer considered a form of error or a loss or absence of the 
truth: “at the end of the eighteenth century, a new outline of madness was becoming 
discernible, where man no longer lost the truth but lost his truth instead” (379). Once truth 
becomes something to be possessed, in the bios and living being of man, then madness would 
entail the personal degeneration of man’s truth. Through the plenitude of artificial passions 
and feelings that modern life had offered, madness emerged as a loss of the individual’s own 
immediate truth at odds with these new feelings (Ibid). This loss of immediacy would lead 
madmen back to a more primal “immediacy where their animal nature raged” that 
accompanied the “sure sign of original guilt” (380). Guilt then becomes the primary 
corrective feeling for all the artificial feelings modern life had had to offer. 
 Part of Foucault’s argument in History of Madness is that the theme of the moral fault 
and guilt of the madman was the origin of psychology as a discipline (HM 338-339). Here 
feelings instigate thought, and just like the fears of alienation had led to the social 
consciousness of madness, the reflection on guilt provided the basis for the psychological 
consciousness of madness. Psychology emerges precisely around the aspects of madness that 
 “It is easy for us to get the impression that the positivist conception of madness is physiological, naturalist 181
and anti-historical, and that it took psychoanalysis, sociology, and nothing less than the ‘psychology of cultures’ 
to bring to light the links that the pathology of history might secretly have with history itself. But in fact this 
was already quite clearly established at the end of the eighteenth century: from that point on, madness was 
clearly inscribed in the temporal destiny of man, and was even the consequence and the price of the fact that 
men, unlike animals, had history. The writer who noted, in an extraordinarily ambiguous phrase, that ‘the 
history of madness is the counterpart of the history of reason’, had read neither Janet, nor Freud nor 
Brunschvicg; he was a contemporary of Claude Bernard, who posited what seemed to him to be an obvious 
equation: ‘to each age its own variety of madness’” (HM 377) This quote is attributed to a nineteenth century 
physician named Dr. Michea, who Foucault cites from an article “Démonomanie” in Volume 11 of Sigismond 
Jaccoud’s Dictionnaire de Médecine et de Chirurgie. See Foucault, History of Madness, 377n60. 
86
are not entirely reducible to an organic sickness and thus bear the marks of a moral fault and 
a personal degeneration of one’s own immanent truth. Physiology and psychology become 
cordoned off as separate domains according to physical and organic treatments that had 
purely mechanical effects on the one hand and moral therapy and punishment on the other. 
This split between physical and moral treatment had broke with the previous regimens and 
treatments advocated by doctors and moralists in the seventeenth century, a whole tradition 
of treatments that were believed to act on the soul and body as an integrated unity.  On the 182
one hand, guilt, the place where, at the heart of man’s essence and being, one’s own truth is at 
stake, becomes the space of a psychological interiority that is to become the object of 
psychology and eventually the space “where modern men seek both their depth and their 
truth” (325). While the passion of Christian shame a millennium earlier had precluded the 
possibility of a scientia affectus with its negative conception of the self, guilt now becomes a 
positive attribute of the human as an object of psychology. While Christian shame had 
opened an inner interiority, guilt gives this interiority a solid basis for scientific truth 
deciphered in the material substance of man’s feelings and passions; man’s truth becomes an 
object of reason rather than the endless confrontations between reason and unreason. Shame 
is instrumentalized, disciplined, and objectified, becoming guilt, altering the subject’s 
relationship with the self and opening the space of a psychological interiority, a deep 
reservoir of animal desires and cathectic energies that psychoanalysis will eventually take as 
its object. 
 Meanwhile, on the other hand, a sensibility of melancholy emerges in response to a 
new medical understanding of the body-as-machine and as a rich density of purely 
physiological mechanisms. Beginning with the discovery of pathological anatomy by Xavier 
Bichat (1771-1802), the space of disease and diagnosis enters a much more thoroughly 
physical space. Postmortem autopsies had demonstrated that the nosology of disease related 
less to the co-presences and orders of symptoms, which had a history dating back to humoral 
 For example, the consumption of iron was believed to directly strengthen the nervous fibres and bring mental 182
fortitude to the soul (HM 309); coffee was supposed to bring dryness without heat to the body and invigorate 
the animal spirits (311); cold water immersion would cool the heat of mania and frenzy, while centuries later it 
would be used in asylums simply as a means of punishment (317); and horseback riding would calm the gastric 
juices and simulate the preternatural movements of the world (318-319). Many of these and similar techniques 
would be used in subsequent centuries but they would “[outlive] their meaning” and would be administered 
either for their purely mechanical effect or as moral punishment (321).)
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medicine, but primarily to tissual and membranous lesions, which are perceptible in surgery 
and autopsy. The language of medical diagnosis would no longer need to provide recourse to 
the daily record of a patient’s symptoms, but could be bent backward toward the physical and 
singular density of things and beings, introducing “language into that penumbra where the 
gaze is bereft of words” (BC 169).  Accompanying this emerging medical gaze of the dense 183
and fleshy space of the body is a new experience of the proximity of life and death, wherein 
the truth of life (and its diseases) is given perfect clarity and singularity only in death (or 
autopsy). For the new medical gaze of the body, “to know life is given only to that derisory, 
reductive, and already infernal knowledge that only wishes it dead.… Now… it is in that 
perception of death that the individual finds himself … [giving] it the style of its own 
truth” (171). It is within this new experience of the truth of life in death that a new aesthetic 
sensibility emerges in the Romantic and Victorian periods, that of the macabre and the 
melancholic, in which the secret truth of life and individual singularity is sought in the final 
void of death (171). Individual truth is secured by death, set upon the background of a new 
objectifying and mortifying medical perception of the body. Now a new experience of the 
passions, whether of melancholy or love, is given an incommensurable and incommunicable 
face and character, secured only by the new place occupied by death: “the lyrical core of 
man” (172). Like modern guilt’s transfiguration of Christian shame, melancholy takes the 
place of Christian fear of the self as not a perception of the potential evil, deception, and 
error always threatening and haunting the soul, but as a perception of a mute organic death 
that haunts the physical singularity of life. In both cases, feeling is substantialized and made 
into the empirical contents of the subject that is the object of a scientia affectus, a science of 
the psyche and a science of bios. 
 Finally, science was applicable to the individual,  producing an individuality at once 184
deeper and more singular and surficial and differentiated. This science of the individual 
 Also, from Bichat’s Anatomie générale, vol. I, (Paris, 1801), xcix: “for twenty years, from morning to night, 183
you have taken notes at patients’ bedsides on affections of the heart, the lungs, and the gastric viscera, and all is 
confusion for you in the symptoms which, refusing to yield up their meaning, offer you a succession of 
incoherent phenomena. Open up a few corpses: you will dissipate at once the darkness that observation alone 
could not dissipate” (qtd. in BC 146).
 “The old Aristotelian law, which prohibited the application of scientific discourse to the individual, was 184
lifted when, in language, death found the locus of its concept: space then opened up to the gaze the 
differentiated form of the individual” (BC 170). 
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would be predicated on a fundamental dehiscence of body and soul, psychology and 
physiology. And so while the ars pathetica functions within the integrated and intermingling 
space of the unity of the body and soul, the scientia affectus operates within the fundamental 
disunity of the body and soul, located squarely in the disequilibrium of the moral landscape 
of a psychological interiority and the physiological density of singular individuality. In the 
nineteenth century the psychological interiority of guilt would become situated within an 
objectification of freedom, conveying with it a set of questions and problems involving the 
juridical and moral responsibility and culpability of the mad (HM 515) but also a positive 
objectification of madness itself. The determination of madness would then be sought in 
man’s estrangement from his own truth; and thus, the truth of madness—indeed the truth of 
truth—lies beyond the mad, in the space where man is a “stranger from himself, 
Alienated” (516). Once man’s relationship with himself becomes split between a moralized 
psychological interiority and a deterministic physiological density, his truth is placed outside 
himself—either in the orders of psychology or physiology—so that he may be reduced “to 
the level of a nature pure and simple, to the level of things” (524). This is where modern 
man, his truth, his passions, and his feelings becomes an object of knowledge for science; 
modern man is a “homo psychologicus” (529).  
 The human sciences emerge precisely around the precariousness of the disequilibrium 
of psychology and physiology, in what Foucault termed the “empirico-transcendental 
doublet,” where man’s condition as a subject of knowledge is brought into question by his 
status as an object of knowledge, in which the empirical knowledge of man as a living, 
speaking, and labouring being was made to extrapolate his transcendental conditions of 
knowledge (OT 321). Here, man’s knowledge of himself in his own finitude and 
determinations was made to operate as his possibility of knowledge, all the while threatening 
the very cohesion and rationality of the conditions of knowledge. Once the empirical facts of 
existence become mapped back onto the transcendental conditions of possibility, the 
transcendental ego becomes the psychological ego. Empirical existence is then sufficient 
reduce man to the mechanisms of physiology and the energetics of psychology, doubly 
convenient for the vast disciplinary machinery required by emerging industrial-capitalist 
power. Man becomes an awkward figure fashioned and doubled between psychology and 
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physiology. Contrary to the transcendental function of the ars pathetica (such as eros, 
epimeleia, and parrhēsia as discussed in Chapter One) that gives style to existence and 
derives truth from the movements of feeling, the scientia affectus satisfies this transcendental 
function with the empirical contents of man’s psychological and biological being. Any 
inquiry into the truth and art of the self thus requires circuiting through the feeling-substances 
of a guilty psyche or a melancholic bios, materializing the movement of feeling and locking 
the subject into an image of their own objectivity as a psychological and biological organism. 
Guilt and melancholy become substances for deciphering psychological or biological truths, 
foundational material for a new science of the self. Rather than communicating the spiritual 
significance of the transcendental conditions of existence, as did the Greek feeling-practices 
of eros, epimeleia, and parrhēsia or the Christian experiences of fear and shame, the feeling-
substances of melancholy and guilt curtail the transcendental horizon by throwing the limits 
of existence back against the empirical finitude of man’s bios and psyche: a sad creature with 
a guilty conscience. Man’s being as a living, speaking, and labouring organism becomes the 
mute and unknowable background upon which he is summoned to know himself in all his 
finitude. It was this precarious position, with regard to man’s knowledge of himself as a 
knowing being, that man, as the subject and object of knowledge, was born and destined to 
“be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea” (387). In his place, man becomes 
knowable as the human, the overdetermined object of anthropological knowledge; but as a 
subject his existence becomes a problem, a phantom, and a memory. This is the birth and 
death of man. 
 And yet, the pathos of the end of man is etched into the very beginning of the modern 
age at the start of the nineteenth century and the dawn of Romantic poetry. It is an end that 
would be both the annihilation and completion of melancholy and guilt. Foucault is fond of 
citing Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843) and Gérard de Nerval (1808-1855) as examples of 
poets who find, in the extremity of the passions, unreason, and madness a truth that, while 
supposedly belonging to the positivity of man as an object of knowledge and psychology, 
also seemed to signify the tragic consciousness of madness that had been dormant following 
the time of Hieronymus Bosch’s (1450-1516) paintings of the mad. But with Romanticism, 
madness, unreason, and the passions represent an inner truth: “the possibility in man of 
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abolishing both man and the world… the end and beginning of all things” (HM 532). A poet, 
whom Foucault does not cite, epitomizes this truth in the sonnet, “Ozymandias” (1818): 
“Nothing beside remains.”  If the scientia affectus emerges with the birth of man in the 185
precarious space of the disequilibrium and doublet of the body and soul, physiology and 
psychology, the empirical and the transcendental, then it is perhaps this simple refrain of the 
end of man that bears the memory of an ars pathetica, the end and culmination of the scientia 
affectus: a memory and reminder that feeling might yet remain transcendental, deriving 
truths about existence, rather than throwing man back against an image of his empirical 
existence. This memory of an ars pathetica in the end of man would represent a rarefaction 
of the empirical image of man’s bios and psyche. Foucault would surely agree: “the art of 
living is the art of killing psychology, of creating with oneself and with others nameless 
individualities, beings, relations, and qualities. If one cannot manage this in life, then it is not 
worth living.”  If modern man is a homo psychologicus, then the art of living, an ars 186
pathetica, entails the end of man (as we know it). While the meaning of the Romantic end of 
man has likely changed between then and now, perhaps this pathos and memory of an ars 
pathetica represents the force and urgency behind many of today’s posthumanisms. Only 
after man, perhaps, can our feelings become art and style.  
3.3: Conclusion 
Unfortunately, we are no closer to answering Massumi’s chicken-egg paradox of society and 
the individual. But rather than falling back on a scientia affectus and a transhistorical theory 
of affect, Foucauldian archaeology helps to convey the historical dimensions of feeling, how, 
for example, guilt emerges in a fashion unique to the modern age as a space opened by 
psychiatric impositions of fault and the psychological interiority discovered as its object. 
Similarly, modern melancholy emerges against a background of changing perceptions of the 
 Percy Bysshe Shelley, “Ozymandias,” Shelley’s Poetry and Prose, ed. Donald H. Reiman and Neil Fraistat 185
(New York: Norton, 2002), 109.
 Michel Foucault, “Conversation avec Werner Schroeter,” Dits et Écrits, vol. 4, 256.186
91
body and its relationship with death.  In both these cases, the scientia affectus oscillates 187
between psychological and physiological determinisms in a space of disequilibrium between 
body and soul. The question is not how the individual and society relate to one another, but to 
what extent we can experience the relationship of the individual and society differently. The 
question for a theory of feeling is not, then, a question of how the experience of deep and 
irreducible individuality squares with the perception of differential social positions. For both 
these experiences entails a relationship with the self and with others that has a specific 
historical emergence in eighteenth and nineteenth century medicine and psychiatry. Rather, 
the question Foucault’s work poses for a theory of feeling is how to give style and art to life, 
in our relationships with ourselves and others that is less objectifying, alienating, or 
mortifying, and thus to innovate new experiences, perceptions, and feelings. It means 
contextualizing the scientia affectus and finding a resource for innovation in an ars pathetica. 
 We saw in the first chapter that the ars pathetica of antiquity entailed a rich 
experience of one’s feelings, truth, and freedom and related to profound ethical practices and 
consciousnesses of time, death, and the other. The ars pathetica represents various ethical 
perceptions and practices that respond to and cohere in the transcendental function of feeling 
in giving truth to existence. In the second chapter, I then showed how this ars pathetica was 
taken up by the early Church Fathers in their understanding of fear and shame, before 
becoming transformed into a more Statist governmental rationality that took feeling as an 
object and substance of power, ethics, and knowledge. The third chapter then sought to pick 
up the historical objectification of feeling as an object of knowledge, which obtained in the 
emergence of a scientia affectus. But while the scientia affectus has undergone an ancillary 
 This is far from saying melancholy and guilt are exclusively modern experiences, but that their appearance 187
of repetition in the modern age is not evidence that they accord to transhistorical subjective experiences or a 
universal identity of forms. Feelings of sadness, for example, may appear to repeat consistently, but the 
transformations in the transcendental horizons of existence alters their experience. This is intimated by 
Foucault’s understanding of historical discontinuity vs. continuity: “today, there are obsessional gestures that 
seem like magic rituals, delirious patterns that are placed in the same light as ancient religious illuminations, 
and in a culture where the presence of the sacred has been absent for so long, a morbid desire to profane 
sometimes surfaces. This persistence seems to be an indicator of the dark memory that accompanies madness, 
condemning its inventiveness to be nothing more than repetition, and often designating it as the spontaneous 
archaeology of cultures. Unreason would be the great memory of peoples, their greatest faithfulness to the past, 
where history is always indefinitely contemporary. All that remains is to invent the universal element within 
which such persistence takes place. But that illusion of identity is a trap: continuity is actually a phenomenon of 
discontinuity, and if such archaic patterns of behaviour have survived, it is only in so far as they have been 
altered. The problem of reappearance only exists for the backward-looking glance; if one follows the warp of 
history, it becomes apparent that the real problem is the transformation of the field of experience” (HM 105).
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abetment through the modern government of feeling, which make feeling into an ethical 
substance requiring management and augmentation, the ars pathetica that had prevailed in 
previous cultures has undergone a profound transformation, all but becoming silenced 
completely. While the affect theories of Deleuze and Guattari, Sedgwick, and Massumi may 
represent attempts to re-articulate an ars pathetica, or at least work through the problems 
inherited from a scientia affectus, the silence of the ars pathetica nevertheless eludes them. 
Instead, this deafening silence resounds in today’s various anxious voices anticipating the 
end of times, from the apocalyptic tenor of theorists such as Eugene Thacker and Jason 
Bahbak Mohaghegh; to “weird fiction” and science fiction writers like Jeff VanderMeer or 
Thomas Ligotti; to the near constant stream of crisis and disaster literature that is found in 
today’s news and social media cycles. In the apocalyptic timbre of our times—times of 
political and economic crisis, plague, social unrest, and ecological disquietude—one may be 
able to hear the echoing memory of another way of life, a different relationship with 
ourselves, intimations of a political and spiritual renewal of feeling. In any case, this burst of 
fascination with the end signifies not so much that end itself, but a cultural obsession 
engraved into the modern episteme—one only need look at the apocalyptic visions of Mary 
Shelley’s The Last Man (1826) to see that continuity in which an art and truth of the self is 
sought in the end. The modern subject is given to the other; the self is made world:  
Peril will now be mine; and I hail her as a friend—death will perpetually cross my 
path, and I will meet him as a benefactor; hardship, inclement weather, and 
dangerous tempests will be my sworn mates. Ye spirits of storm, receive me! ye 
powers of destruction, open wide your arms, and clasp me for ever! if a kinder power 
have not decreed another end, so that after long endurance I may reap my reward, 
and again feel my heart beat near the heart of another like to me.   188
What stands waiting to be overcome is this obsession with the end—the end of ends—which 
is what, in the last instance, the ars pathetica threatens to achieve. 
 Mary Shelley, The Last Man, ed. Anne McWhir (Peterborough, ON: Broadview, 1996), 366.188
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